diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'helper')
| -rw-r--r-- | helper/bwrap.go | 41 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | helper/bwrap/arg.go | 63 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | helper/bwrap/config.go | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | helper/bwrap/seccomp-export.c | 254 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | helper/bwrap/seccomp-export.h | 22 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | helper/bwrap/seccomp-resolve.go | 95 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | helper/bwrap/seccomp.go | 83 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | helper/bwrap/sequential.go | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | helper/bwrap_test.go | 12 |
9 files changed, 547 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/helper/bwrap.go b/helper/bwrap.go index ad077312..851f2448 100644 --- a/helper/bwrap.go +++ b/helper/bwrap.go @@ -9,25 +9,17 @@ import ( "sync" "git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/helper/bwrap" - "git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/internal/proc" ) // BubblewrapName is the file name or path to bubblewrap. var BubblewrapName = "bwrap" -type BwrapExtraFile struct { - Name string - File *os.File -} - type bubblewrap struct { // bwrap child file name name string // bwrap pipes control *pipes - // extra files with fd passed as argument - extra []BwrapExtraFile // returns an array of arguments passed directly // to the child process spawned by bwrap argF func(argsFD, statFD int) []string @@ -54,14 +46,6 @@ func (b *bubblewrap) StartNotify(ready chan error) error { return errors.New("exec: already started") } - // pass extra fd to bwrap - for _, e := range b.extra { - if e.File == nil { - continue - } - b.Cmd.Args = append(b.Cmd.Args, e.Name, strconv.Itoa(int(proc.ExtraFile(b.Cmd, e.File)))) - } - // prepare bwrap pipe and args if argsFD, _, err := b.control.prepareCmd(b.Cmd); err != nil { return err @@ -130,9 +114,10 @@ func (b *bubblewrap) Unwrap() *exec.Cmd { func MustNewBwrap( conf *bwrap.Config, name string, wt io.WriterTo, argF func(argsFD, statFD int) []string, - extra []BwrapExtraFile, + extraFiles []*os.File, + syncFd *os.File, ) Helper { - b, err := NewBwrap(conf, name, wt, argF, extra) + b, err := NewBwrap(conf, name, wt, argF, extraFiles, syncFd) if err != nil { panic(err.Error()) } else { @@ -146,23 +131,27 @@ func MustNewBwrap( func NewBwrap( conf *bwrap.Config, name string, wt io.WriterTo, argF func(argsFD, statFD int) []string, - extra []BwrapExtraFile, + extraFiles []*os.File, + syncFd *os.File, ) (Helper, error) { b := new(bubblewrap) - if args, err := NewCheckedArgs(conf.Args()); err != nil { - return nil, err - } else { - b.control = &pipes{args: args} - } - - b.extra = extra b.argF = argF b.name = name if wt != nil { b.controlPt = &pipes{args: wt} } + b.Cmd = execCommand(BubblewrapName) + b.control = new(pipes) + args := conf.Args() + if fdArgs, err := conf.FDArgs(syncFd, &extraFiles); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if b.control.args, err = NewCheckedArgs(append(args, fdArgs...)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else { + b.Cmd.ExtraFiles = extraFiles + } return b, nil } diff --git a/helper/bwrap/arg.go b/helper/bwrap/arg.go index efdab823..d419ba50 100644 --- a/helper/bwrap/arg.go +++ b/helper/bwrap/arg.go @@ -1,6 +1,13 @@ package bwrap -import "encoding/gob" +import ( + "encoding/gob" + "os" + "slices" + "strconv" + + "git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/internal/proc" +) type Builder interface { Len() int @@ -12,6 +19,11 @@ type FSBuilder interface { Builder } +type FDBuilder interface { + Len() int + Append(args *[]string, extraFiles *[]*os.File) error +} + func init() { gob.Register(new(pairF)) gob.Register(new(stringF)) @@ -45,6 +57,33 @@ func (s stringF) Append(args *[]string) { *args = append(*args, s[0], s[1]) } +type fileF struct { + name string + file *os.File +} + +func (f *fileF) Len() int { + if f.file == nil { + return 0 + } + return 2 +} + +func (f *fileF) Append(args *[]string, extraFiles *[]*os.File) error { + if f.file == nil { + return nil + } + extraFile(args, extraFiles, f.name, f.file) + return nil +} + +func extraFile(args *[]string, extraFiles *[]*os.File, name string, f *os.File) { + if f == nil { + return + } + *args = append(*args, name, strconv.Itoa(int(proc.ExtraFileSlice(extraFiles, f)))) +} + // Args returns a slice of bwrap args corresponding to c. func (c *Config) Args() (args []string) { builders := []Builder{ @@ -75,3 +114,25 @@ func (c *Config) Args() (args []string) { return } + +func (c *Config) FDArgs(syncFd *os.File, extraFiles *[]*os.File) (args []string, err error) { + builders := []FDBuilder{ + &seccompBuilder{c}, + &fileF{positionalArgs[SyncFd], syncFd}, + } + + argc := 0 + for _, b := range builders { + argc += b.Len() + } + + args = make([]string, 0, argc) + *extraFiles = slices.Grow(*extraFiles, len(builders)) + + for _, b := range builders { + if err = b.Append(&args, extraFiles); err != nil { + break + } + } + return +} diff --git a/helper/bwrap/config.go b/helper/bwrap/config.go index 8def27a6..b9fa0c12 100644 --- a/helper/bwrap/config.go +++ b/helper/bwrap/config.go @@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ type Config struct { // (--chmod OCTAL PATH) Chmod ChmodConfig `json:"chmod,omitempty"` + // load and use seccomp rules from FD (not repeatable) + // (--seccomp FD) + Syscall *SyscallPolicy + // create a new terminal session // (--new-session) NewSession bool `json:"new_session"` @@ -70,7 +74,6 @@ type Config struct { --file FD DEST Copy from FD to destination DEST --bind-data FD DEST Copy from FD to file which is bind-mounted on DEST --ro-bind-data FD DEST Copy from FD to file which is readonly bind-mounted on DEST - --seccomp FD Load and use seccomp rules from FD (not repeatable) --add-seccomp-fd FD Load and use seccomp rules from FD (repeatable) --block-fd FD Block on FD until some data to read is available --userns-block-fd FD Block on FD until the user namespace is ready diff --git a/helper/bwrap/seccomp-export.c b/helper/bwrap/seccomp-export.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..40e3bea9 --- /dev/null +++ b/helper/bwrap/seccomp-export.c @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE +#define _GNU_SOURCE // CLONE_NEWUSER +#endif + +#include "seccomp-export.h" +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <sys/syscall.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/ioctl.h> +#include <sys/personality.h> +#include <sched.h> + +#if (SCMP_VER_MAJOR < 2) || \ + (SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR < 5) || \ + (SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR == 5 && SCMP_VER_MICRO < 1) +#error This package requires libseccomp >= v2.5.1 +#endif + +struct f_syscall_act { + int syscall; + int m_errno; + struct scmp_arg_cmp *arg; +}; + +#define LEN(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0])) + +#define SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(ruleset) do { \ + F_println("adding seccomp ruleset \"" #ruleset "\""); \ + for (int i = 0; i < LEN(ruleset); i++) { \ + assert(ruleset[i].m_errno == EPERM || ruleset[i].m_errno == ENOSYS); \ + \ + if (ruleset[i].arg) \ + ret = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ruleset[i].m_errno), ruleset[i].syscall, 1, *ruleset[i].arg); \ + else \ + ret = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ruleset[i].m_errno), ruleset[i].syscall, 0); \ + \ + if (ret == -EFAULT) { \ + res = 4; \ + goto out; \ + } else if (ret < 0) { \ + res = 5; \ + errno = -ret; \ + goto out; \ + } \ + } \ +} while (0) + + +int f_tmpfile_fd() { + FILE *f = tmpfile(); + if (f == NULL) + return -1; + return fileno(f); +} + +int32_t f_export_bpf(int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_syscall_opts opts) { + int32_t res = 0; // refer to resErr for meaning + int allow_multiarch = opts & F_MULTIARCH; + int allowed_personality = PER_LINUX; + + if (opts & F_LINUX32) + allowed_personality = PER_LINUX32; + + // flatpak commit 4c3bf179e2e4a2a298cd1db1d045adaf3f564532 + + struct f_syscall_act deny_common[] = { + // Block dmesg + {SCMP_SYS(syslog), EPERM}, + // Useless old syscall + {SCMP_SYS(uselib), EPERM}, + // Don't allow disabling accounting + {SCMP_SYS(acct), EPERM}, + // Don't allow reading current quota use + {SCMP_SYS(quotactl), EPERM}, + + // Don't allow access to the kernel keyring + {SCMP_SYS(add_key), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS(keyctl), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS(request_key), EPERM}, + + // Scary VM/NUMA ops + {SCMP_SYS(move_pages), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS(mbind), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS(get_mempolicy), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS(set_mempolicy), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS(migrate_pages), EPERM}, + }; + + struct f_syscall_act deny_ns[] = { + // Don't allow subnamespace setups: + {SCMP_SYS(unshare), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS(setns), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS(mount), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS(umount), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS(umount2), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS(pivot_root), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS(chroot), EPERM}, +#if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__CRIS__) + // Architectures with CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS2: the child stack + // and flags arguments are reversed so the flags come second + {SCMP_SYS(clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)}, +#else + // Normally the flags come first + {SCMP_SYS(clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)}, +#endif + + // seccomp can't look into clone3()'s struct clone_args to check whether + // the flags are OK, so we have no choice but to block clone3(). + // Return ENOSYS so user-space will fall back to clone(). + // (CVE-2021-41133; see also https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/9f6b562d) + {SCMP_SYS(clone3), ENOSYS}, + + // New mount manipulation APIs can also change our VFS. There's no + // legitimate reason to do these in the sandbox, so block all of them + // rather than thinking about which ones might be dangerous. + // (CVE-2021-41133) + {SCMP_SYS(open_tree), ENOSYS}, + {SCMP_SYS(move_mount), ENOSYS}, + {SCMP_SYS(fsopen), ENOSYS}, + {SCMP_SYS(fsconfig), ENOSYS}, + {SCMP_SYS(fsmount), ENOSYS}, + {SCMP_SYS(fspick), ENOSYS}, + {SCMP_SYS(mount_setattr), ENOSYS}, + }; + + struct f_syscall_act deny_tty[] = { + // Don't allow faking input to the controlling tty (CVE-2017-5226) + {SCMP_SYS(ioctl), EPERM, &SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int)TIOCSTI)}, + // In the unlikely event that the controlling tty is a Linux virtual + // console (/dev/tty2 or similar), copy/paste operations have an effect + // similar to TIOCSTI (CVE-2023-28100) + {SCMP_SYS(ioctl), EPERM, &SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int)TIOCLINUX)}, + }; + + struct f_syscall_act deny_devel[] = { + // Profiling operations; we expect these to be done by tools from outside + // the sandbox. In particular perf has been the source of many CVEs. + {SCMP_SYS(perf_event_open), EPERM}, + // Don't allow you to switch to bsd emulation or whatnot + {SCMP_SYS(personality), EPERM, &SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_NE, allowed_personality)}, + + {SCMP_SYS(ptrace), EPERM} + }; + + // Blocklist all but unix, inet, inet6 and netlink + struct + { + int family; + f_syscall_opts flags_mask; + } socket_family_allowlist[] = { + // NOTE: Keep in numerical order + { AF_UNSPEC, 0 }, + { AF_LOCAL, 0 }, + { AF_INET, 0 }, + { AF_INET6, 0 }, + { AF_NETLINK, 0 }, + { AF_CAN, F_CAN }, + { AF_BLUETOOTH, F_BLUETOOTH }, + }; + + scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); + if (ctx == NULL) { + res = 1; + goto out; + } else + errno = 0; + + int ret; + + // We only really need to handle arches on multiarch systems. + // If only one arch is supported the default is fine + if (arch != 0) { + // This *adds* the target arch, instead of replacing the + // native one. This is not ideal, because we'd like to only + // allow the target arch, but we can't really disallow the + // native arch at this point, because then bubblewrap + // couldn't continue running. + ret = seccomp_arch_add(ctx, arch); + if (ret < 0 && ret != -EEXIST) { + res = 2; + errno = -ret; + goto out; + } + + if (allow_multiarch && multiarch != 0) { + ret = seccomp_arch_add(ctx, multiarch); + if (ret < 0 && ret != -EEXIST) { + res = 3; + errno = -ret; + goto out; + } + } + } + + SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_common); + if (opts & F_DENY_NS) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_ns); + if (opts & F_DENY_TTY) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_tty); + if (opts & F_DENY_DEVEL) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_devel); + + if (!allow_multiarch) { + F_println("disabling modify_ldt"); + + // modify_ldt is a historic source of interesting information leaks, + // so it's disabled as a hardening measure. + // However, it is required to run old 16-bit applications + // as well as some Wine patches, so it's allowed in multiarch. + ret = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(modify_ldt), 0); + + // See above for the meaning of EFAULT. + if (ret == -EFAULT) { + // call fmsg here? + res = 4; + goto out; + } else if (ret < 0) { + res = 5; + errno = -ret; + goto out; + } + } + + // Socket filtering doesn't work on e.g. i386, so ignore failures here + // However, we need to user seccomp_rule_add_exact to avoid libseccomp doing + // something else: https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/8 + int last_allowed_family = -1; + for (int i = 0; i < LEN(socket_family_allowlist); i++) { + if (socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask != 0 && + (socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask & opts) != socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask) + continue; + + for (int disallowed = last_allowed_family + 1; disallowed < socket_family_allowlist[i].family; disallowed++) { + // Blocklist the in-between valid families + seccomp_rule_add_exact(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS(socket), 1, SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, disallowed)); + } + last_allowed_family = socket_family_allowlist[i].family; + } + // Blocklist the rest + seccomp_rule_add_exact(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS(socket), 1, SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GE, last_allowed_family + 1)); + + ret = seccomp_export_bpf(ctx, fd); + if (ret != 0) { + res = 6; + errno = -ret; + goto out; + } + +out: + if (ctx) + seccomp_release(ctx); + + return res; +} diff --git a/helper/bwrap/seccomp-export.h b/helper/bwrap/seccomp-export.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5df0dc65 --- /dev/null +++ b/helper/bwrap/seccomp-export.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +#include <stdint.h> +#include <seccomp.h> + +#if (SCMP_VER_MAJOR < 2) || \ + (SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR < 5) || \ + (SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR == 5 && SCMP_VER_MICRO < 1) +#error This package requires libseccomp >= v2.5.1 +#endif + +typedef enum { + F_DENY_NS = 1 << 0, + F_DENY_TTY = 1 << 1, + F_DENY_DEVEL = 1 << 2, + F_MULTIARCH = 1 << 3, + F_LINUX32 = 1 << 4, + F_CAN = 1 << 5, + F_BLUETOOTH = 1 << 6, +} f_syscall_opts; + +extern void F_println(char *v); +int f_tmpfile_fd(); +int32_t f_export_bpf(int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_syscall_opts opts);
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/helper/bwrap/seccomp-resolve.go b/helper/bwrap/seccomp-resolve.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..995a3719 --- /dev/null +++ b/helper/bwrap/seccomp-resolve.go @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +package bwrap + +import ( + "fmt" + "io" + "os" + + "git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/internal/fmsg" +) + +type SyscallPolicy struct { + DenyDevel bool `json:"deny_devel"` + Multiarch bool `json:"multiarch"` + Linux32 bool `json:"linux32"` + Can bool `json:"can"` + Bluetooth bool `json:"bluetooth"` +} + +type seccompBuilder struct { + config *Config +} + +func (s *seccompBuilder) Len() int { + if s == nil { + return 0 + } + return 2 +} + +func (s *seccompBuilder) Append(args *[]string, extraFiles *[]*os.File) error { + if s == nil { + return nil + } + if f, err := s.config.resolveSeccomp(); err != nil { + return err + } else { + extraFile(args, extraFiles, positionalArgs[Seccomp], f) + return nil + } +} + +func (c *Config) resolveSeccomp() (*os.File, error) { + if c.Syscall == nil { + return nil, nil + } + + // resolve seccomp filter opts + var ( + opts syscallOpts + optd []string + optCond = [...]struct { + v bool + o syscallOpts + d string + }{ + {!c.UserNS, flagDenyNS, "denyns"}, + {c.NewSession, flagDenyTTY, "denytty"}, + {c.Syscall.DenyDevel, flagDenyDevel, "denydevel"}, + {c.Syscall.Multiarch, flagMultiarch, "multiarch"}, + {c.Syscall.Linux32, flagLinux32, "linux32"}, + {c.Syscall.Can, flagCan, "can"}, + {c.Syscall.Bluetooth, flagBluetooth, "bluetooth"}, + } + ) + if CPrintln != nil { + optd = make([]string, 1, len(optCond)+1) + optd[0] = "common" + } + for _, opt := range optCond { + if opt.v { + opts |= opt.o + if fmsg.Verbose() { + optd = append(optd, opt.d) + } + } + } + if CPrintln != nil { + CPrintln(fmt.Sprintf("seccomp flags: %s", optd)) + } + + // export seccomp filter to tmpfile + if f, err := tmpfile(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else { + return f, exportAndSeek(f, opts) + } +} + +func exportAndSeek(f *os.File, opts syscallOpts) error { + if err := exportFilter(f.Fd(), opts); err != nil { + return err + } + _, err := f.Seek(0, io.SeekStart) + return err +} diff --git a/helper/bwrap/seccomp.go b/helper/bwrap/seccomp.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..abc2738b --- /dev/null +++ b/helper/bwrap/seccomp.go @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +package bwrap + +/* +#cgo linux pkg-config: --static libseccomp + +#include "seccomp-export.h" +*/ +import "C" +import ( + "errors" + "fmt" + "os" + "runtime" +) + +var CPrintln func(v ...any) + +var resErr = [...]error{ + 0: nil, + 1: errors.New("seccomp_init failed"), + 2: errors.New("seccomp_arch_add failed"), + 3: errors.New("seccomp_arch_add failed (multiarch)"), + 4: errors.New("internal libseccomp failure"), + 5: errors.New("seccomp_rule_add failed"), + 6: errors.New("seccomp_export_bpf failed"), +} + +type ( + syscallOpts = C.f_syscall_opts +) + +const ( + flagDenyNS syscallOpts = C.F_DENY_NS + flagDenyTTY syscallOpts = C.F_DENY_TTY + flagDenyDevel syscallOpts = C.F_DENY_DEVEL + flagMultiarch syscallOpts = C.F_MULTIARCH + flagLinux32 syscallOpts = C.F_LINUX32 + flagCan syscallOpts = C.F_CAN + flagBluetooth syscallOpts = C.F_BLUETOOTH +) + +func tmpfile() (*os.File, error) { + fd, err := C.f_tmpfile_fd() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), "tmpfile"), err +} + +func exportFilter(fd uintptr, opts syscallOpts) error { + var ( + arch C.uint32_t = 0 + multiarch C.uint32_t = 0 + ) + switch runtime.GOARCH { + case "386": + arch = C.SCMP_ARCH_X86 + case "amd64": + arch = C.SCMP_ARCH_X86_64 + multiarch = C.SCMP_ARCH_X86 + case "arm": + arch = C.SCMP_ARCH_ARM + case "arm64": + arch = C.SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64 + multiarch = C.SCMP_ARCH_ARM + } + + res, err := C.f_export_bpf(C.int(fd), arch, multiarch, opts) + if re := resErr[res]; re != nil { + if err == nil { + return re + } + return fmt.Errorf("%s: %v", re.Error(), err) + } + return err +} + +//export F_println +func F_println(v *C.char) { + if CPrintln != nil { + CPrintln(C.GoString(v)) + } +} diff --git a/helper/bwrap/sequential.go b/helper/bwrap/sequential.go index 42a4b2b5..1776c235 100644 --- a/helper/bwrap/sequential.go +++ b/helper/bwrap/sequential.go @@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ const ( Overlay TmpOverlay ROOverlay + + SyncFd + Seccomp ) var positionalArgs = [...]string{ @@ -70,6 +73,9 @@ var positionalArgs = [...]string{ Overlay: "--overlay", TmpOverlay: "--tmp-overlay", ROOverlay: "--ro-overlay", + + SyncFd: "--sync-fd", + Seccomp: "--seccomp", } type PermConfig[T FSBuilder] struct { diff --git a/helper/bwrap_test.go b/helper/bwrap_test.go index 9a565a42..0860d57a 100644 --- a/helper/bwrap_test.go +++ b/helper/bwrap_test.go @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ func TestBwrap(t *testing.T) { h := helper.MustNewBwrap( sc, "fortify", argsWt, argF, - nil, + nil, nil, ) if err := h.Start(); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ func TestBwrap(t *testing.T) { if got := helper.MustNewBwrap( sc, "fortify", argsWt, argF, - nil, + nil, nil, ); got == nil { t.Errorf("MustNewBwrap(%#v, %#v, %#v) got nil", sc, argsWt, "fortify") @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ func TestBwrap(t *testing.T) { helper.MustNewBwrap( &bwrap.Config{Hostname: "\x00"}, "fortify", nil, argF, - nil, + nil, nil, ) }) @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func TestBwrap(t *testing.T) { helper.MustNewBwrap( sc, "fortify", nil, argF, - nil, + nil, nil, ).StartNotify(make(chan error)))) }) @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ func TestBwrap(t *testing.T) { h := helper.MustNewBwrap( sc, "crash-test-dummy", nil, argFChecked, - nil, + nil, nil, ) cmd := h.Unwrap() @@ -127,6 +127,6 @@ func TestBwrap(t *testing.T) { }) t.Run("implementation compliance", func(t *testing.T) { - testHelper(t, func() helper.Helper { return helper.MustNewBwrap(sc, "crash-test-dummy", argsWt, argF, nil) }) + testHelper(t, func() helper.Helper { return helper.MustNewBwrap(sc, "crash-test-dummy", argsWt, argF, nil, nil) }) }) } |