treewide: rename to hakurei

Fortify makes little sense for a container tool.

Signed-off-by: Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk>

7 files changed, 57 insertions, 57 deletions

diff --git a/sandbox/seccomp/api.go b/sandbox/seccomp/api.go
index f084a14f..81fb68cf 100644
--- a/sandbox/seccomp/api.go
+++ b/sandbox/seccomp/api.go
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"syscall"
 
-	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/helper/proc"
+	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/hakurei/helper/proc"
 )
 
 const (
diff --git a/sandbox/seccomp/export_test.go b/sandbox/seccomp/export_test.go
index dbe4d74f..482d6e5d 100644
--- a/sandbox/seccomp/export_test.go
+++ b/sandbox/seccomp/export_test.go
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"syscall"
 	"testing"
 
-	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/sandbox/seccomp"
+	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/hakurei/sandbox/seccomp"
 )
 
 func TestExport(t *testing.T) {
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func TestExport(t *testing.T) {
 			0x80, 0x8b, 0x1a, 0x6f, 0x84, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0xbd,
 			0xe1, 0xaa, 0x02, 0xae, 0x30, 0xee, 0xdc, 0xfa,
 		}, false},
-		{"fortify default", seccomp.FilterExt | seccomp.FilterDenyDevel, []byte{
+		{"hakurei default", seccomp.FilterExt | seccomp.FilterDenyDevel, []byte{
 			0xc6, 0x98, 0xb0, 0x81, 0xff, 0x95, 0x7a, 0xfe,
 			0x17, 0xa6, 0xd9, 0x43, 0x74, 0x53, 0x7d, 0x37,
 			0xf2, 0xa6, 0x3f, 0x6f, 0x9d, 0xd7, 0x5d, 0xa7,
diff --git a/sandbox/seccomp/output.go b/sandbox/seccomp/output.go
index db81feb9..27d50983 100644
--- a/sandbox/seccomp/output.go
+++ b/sandbox/seccomp/output.go
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ func GetOutput() func(v ...any) {
 	}
 }
 
-//export f_println
-func f_println(v *C.char) {
+//export hakurei_println
+func hakurei_println(v *C.char) {
 	if fp := printlnP.Load(); fp != nil {
 		(*fp)(C.GoString(v))
 	}
diff --git a/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp-build.c b/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp-build.c
index a6dc40d5..6eb3c53f 100644
--- a/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp-build.c
+++ b/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp-build.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 #error This package requires libseccomp >= v2.5.1
 #endif
 
-struct f_syscall_act {
+struct hakurei_syscall_act {
   int syscall;
   int m_errno;
   struct scmp_arg_cmp *arg;
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ struct f_syscall_act {
 
 #define SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(ruleset)                                           \
   do {                                                                         \
-    if (opts & F_VERBOSE)                                                      \
-      f_println("adding seccomp ruleset \"" #ruleset "\"");                    \
+    if (opts & HAKUREI_VERBOSE)                                                      \
+      hakurei_println("adding seccomp ruleset \"" #ruleset "\"");                    \
     for (int i = 0; i < LEN(ruleset); i++) {                                   \
       assert(ruleset[i].m_errno == EPERM || ruleset[i].m_errno == ENOSYS);     \
                                                                                \
@@ -50,18 +50,18 @@ struct f_syscall_act {
     }                                                                          \
   } while (0)
 
-int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
-                       f_filter_opts opts) {
+int32_t hakurei_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
+                       hakurei_filter_opts opts) {
   int32_t res = 0; /* refer to resPrefix for message */
-  int allow_multiarch = opts & F_MULTIARCH;
+  int allow_multiarch = opts & HAKUREI_MULTIARCH;
   int allowed_personality = PER_LINUX;
 
-  if (opts & F_LINUX32)
+  if (opts & HAKUREI_LINUX32)
     allowed_personality = PER_LINUX32;
 
   /* flatpak commit 4c3bf179e2e4a2a298cd1db1d045adaf3f564532 */
 
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_common[] = {
+  struct hakurei_syscall_act deny_common[] = {
       /* Block dmesg */
       {SCMP_SYS(syslog), EPERM},
       /* Useless old syscall */
@@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
       {SCMP_SYS(migrate_pages), EPERM},
   };
 
-  /* fortify: project-specific extensions */
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_common_ext[] = {
+  /* hakurei: project-specific extensions */
+  struct hakurei_syscall_act deny_common_ext[] = {
       /* system calls for changing the system clock */
       {SCMP_SYS(adjtimex), EPERM},
       {SCMP_SYS(clock_adjtime), EPERM},
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
       {SCMP_SYS(swapon), EPERM},
   };
 
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_ns[] = {
+  struct hakurei_syscall_act deny_ns[] = {
       /* Don't allow subnamespace setups: */
       {SCMP_SYS(unshare), EPERM},
       {SCMP_SYS(setns), EPERM},
@@ -149,8 +149,8 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
       {SCMP_SYS(mount_setattr), ENOSYS},
   };
 
-  /* fortify: project-specific extensions */
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_ns_ext[] = {
+  /* hakurei: project-specific extensions */
+  struct hakurei_syscall_act deny_ns_ext[] = {
       /* changing file ownership */
       {SCMP_SYS(chown), EPERM},
       {SCMP_SYS(chown32), EPERM},
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
       {SCMP_SYS(setuid32), EPERM},
   };
 
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_tty[] = {
+  struct hakurei_syscall_act deny_tty[] = {
       /* Don't allow faking input to the controlling tty (CVE-2017-5226) */
       {SCMP_SYS(ioctl), EPERM,
        &SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int)TIOCSTI)},
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
        &SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int)TIOCLINUX)},
   };
 
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_devel[] = {
+  struct hakurei_syscall_act deny_devel[] = {
       /* Profiling operations; we expect these to be done by tools from outside
        * the sandbox.  In particular perf has been the source of many CVEs. */
       {SCMP_SYS(perf_event_open), EPERM},
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
 
       {SCMP_SYS(ptrace), EPERM}};
 
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_emu[] = {
+  struct hakurei_syscall_act deny_emu[] = {
       /* modify_ldt is a historic source of interesting information leaks,
        * so it's disabled as a hardening measure.
        * However, it is required to run old 16-bit applications
@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
       {SCMP_SYS(modify_ldt), EPERM},
   };
 
-  /* fortify: project-specific extensions */
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_emu_ext[] = {
+  /* hakurei: project-specific extensions */
+  struct hakurei_syscall_act deny_emu_ext[] = {
       {SCMP_SYS(subpage_prot), ENOSYS},
       {SCMP_SYS(switch_endian), ENOSYS},
       {SCMP_SYS(vm86), ENOSYS},
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
   /* Blocklist all but unix, inet, inet6 and netlink */
   struct {
     int family;
-    f_filter_opts flags_mask;
+    hakurei_filter_opts flags_mask;
   } socket_family_allowlist[] = {
       /* NOTE: Keep in numerical order */
       {AF_UNSPEC, 0},
@@ -225,8 +225,8 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
       {AF_INET, 0},
       {AF_INET6, 0},
       {AF_NETLINK, 0},
-      {AF_CAN, F_CAN},
-      {AF_BLUETOOTH, F_BLUETOOTH},
+      {AF_CAN, HAKUREI_CAN},
+      {AF_BLUETOOTH, HAKUREI_BLUETOOTH},
   };
 
   scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
@@ -260,17 +260,17 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
   }
 
   SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_common);
-  if (opts & F_DENY_NS)
+  if (opts & HAKUREI_DENY_NS)
     SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_ns);
-  if (opts & F_DENY_TTY)
+  if (opts & HAKUREI_DENY_TTY)
     SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_tty);
-  if (opts & F_DENY_DEVEL)
+  if (opts & HAKUREI_DENY_DEVEL)
     SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_devel);
   if (!allow_multiarch)
     SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_emu);
-  if (opts & F_EXT) {
+  if (opts & HAKUREI_EXT) {
     SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_common_ext);
-    if (opts & F_DENY_NS)
+    if (opts & HAKUREI_DENY_NS)
       SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_ns_ext);
     if (!allow_multiarch)
       SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_emu_ext);
diff --git a/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp-build.h b/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp-build.h
index 9a4e4d7a..10f6eac2 100644
--- a/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp-build.h
+++ b/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp-build.h
@@ -7,17 +7,17 @@
 #endif
 
 typedef enum {
-  F_VERBOSE = 1 << 0,
-  F_EXT = 1 << 1,
-  F_DENY_NS = 1 << 2,
-  F_DENY_TTY = 1 << 3,
-  F_DENY_DEVEL = 1 << 4,
-  F_MULTIARCH = 1 << 5,
-  F_LINUX32 = 1 << 6,
-  F_CAN = 1 << 7,
-  F_BLUETOOTH = 1 << 8,
-} f_filter_opts;
+  HAKUREI_VERBOSE = 1 << 0,
+  HAKUREI_EXT = 1 << 1,
+  HAKUREI_DENY_NS = 1 << 2,
+  HAKUREI_DENY_TTY = 1 << 3,
+  HAKUREI_DENY_DEVEL = 1 << 4,
+  HAKUREI_MULTIARCH = 1 << 5,
+  HAKUREI_LINUX32 = 1 << 6,
+  HAKUREI_CAN = 1 << 7,
+  HAKUREI_BLUETOOTH = 1 << 8,
+} hakurei_filter_opts;
 
-extern void f_println(char *v);
-int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
-                       f_filter_opts opts);
\ No newline at end of file
+extern void hakurei_println(char *v);
+int32_t hakurei_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
+                       hakurei_filter_opts opts);
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp.go b/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp.go
index 944d5429..f897ee5f 100644
--- a/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp.go
+++ b/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp.go
@@ -57,26 +57,26 @@ var resPrefix = [...]string{
 	7: "seccomp_load failed",
 }
 
-type FilterOpts = C.f_filter_opts
+type FilterOpts = C.hakurei_filter_opts
 
 const (
-	filterVerbose FilterOpts = C.F_VERBOSE
+	filterVerbose FilterOpts = C.HAKUREI_VERBOSE
 	// FilterExt are project-specific extensions.
-	FilterExt FilterOpts = C.F_EXT
+	FilterExt FilterOpts = C.HAKUREI_EXT
 	// FilterDenyNS denies namespace setup syscalls.
-	FilterDenyNS FilterOpts = C.F_DENY_NS
+	FilterDenyNS FilterOpts = C.HAKUREI_DENY_NS
 	// FilterDenyTTY denies faking input.
-	FilterDenyTTY FilterOpts = C.F_DENY_TTY
+	FilterDenyTTY FilterOpts = C.HAKUREI_DENY_TTY
 	// FilterDenyDevel denies development-related syscalls.
-	FilterDenyDevel FilterOpts = C.F_DENY_DEVEL
+	FilterDenyDevel FilterOpts = C.HAKUREI_DENY_DEVEL
 	// FilterMultiarch allows multiarch/emulation.
-	FilterMultiarch FilterOpts = C.F_MULTIARCH
+	FilterMultiarch FilterOpts = C.HAKUREI_MULTIARCH
 	// FilterLinux32 sets PER_LINUX32.
-	FilterLinux32 FilterOpts = C.F_LINUX32
+	FilterLinux32 FilterOpts = C.HAKUREI_LINUX32
 	// FilterCan allows AF_CAN.
-	FilterCan FilterOpts = C.F_CAN
+	FilterCan FilterOpts = C.HAKUREI_CAN
 	// FilterBluetooth allows AF_BLUETOOTH.
-	FilterBluetooth FilterOpts = C.F_BLUETOOTH
+	FilterBluetooth FilterOpts = C.HAKUREI_BLUETOOTH
 )
 
 func buildFilter(fd int, opts FilterOpts) error {
@@ -98,13 +98,13 @@ func buildFilter(fd int, opts FilterOpts) error {
 	}
 
 	// this removes repeated transitions between C and Go execution
-	// when producing log output via F_println and CPrintln is nil
+	// when producing log output via hakurei_println and CPrintln is nil
 	if fp := printlnP.Load(); fp != nil {
 		opts |= filterVerbose
 	}
 
 	var ret C.int
-	res, err := C.f_build_filter(&ret, C.int(fd), arch, multiarch, opts)
+	res, err := C.hakurei_build_filter(&ret, C.int(fd), arch, multiarch, opts)
 	if prefix := resPrefix[res]; prefix != "" {
 		return &LibraryError{
 			prefix,
diff --git a/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp_test.go b/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp_test.go
index 3c7f5339..21198bfd 100644
--- a/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp_test.go
+++ b/sandbox/seccomp/seccomp_test.go
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"syscall"
 	"testing"
 
-	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/sandbox/seccomp"
+	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/hakurei/sandbox/seccomp"
 )
 
 func TestLibraryError(t *testing.T) {