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authorDaniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>2020-03-02 05:16:55 -0500
committerDaniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>2020-03-02 05:16:55 -0500
commit70fc36a6e2765f2419f4ac36b012166193e0632d (patch)
tree2c1e352e7961c4f56348c05fe5e01180e1837ff3 /static
parent77b304c92e991d45bf7a533a9afa83f457378fc1 (diff)
reorder FAQ
Diffstat (limited to 'static')
-rw-r--r--static/faq.html80
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/static/faq.html b/static/faq.html
index 4933c154..c63ed287 100644
--- a/static/faq.html
+++ b/static/faq.html
@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@
<ul>
<li><a href="#hardware-identifiers">Can apps access hardware
identifiers?</a></li>
- <li><a href="#default-connections">Which connections do the OS and
- bundled apps make by default?</a></li>
<li><a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular
tracking and silent SMS?</a></li>
+ <li><a href="#default-connections">Which connections do the OS and
+ bundled apps make by default?</a></li>
<li><a href="#default-dns">Which DNS servers are used by default?</a></li>
<li><a href="#custom-dns">How do I use a custom DNS server?</a></li>
<li><a href="#private-dns-ip">Why does Private DNS not accept IP
@@ -255,6 +255,44 @@
<p>GrapheneOS only makes a small change to remove a legacy form of access to the
serial number by legacy apps, which was still around for compatibility.</p>
+ <h3 id="cellular-tracking">
+ <a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular tracking and
+ silent SMS?</a>
+ </h3>
+
+ <p>GrapheneOS always considers the network to be hostile and does not implement weak
+ or useless mitigations. Therefore, it does not have the assorted gimmicks seen elsewhere
+ providing privacy/security theatre to make users feel better about these issues. One
+ of the core tenets of GrapheneOS is being honest with users and avoiding scams/frills
+ based around marketing rather than real world privacy/security threat models.</p>
+
+ <p>Activating airplane mode will fully disable the cellular radio transmit and receive
+ capabilities, which will prevent your phone from being reached from the cellular
+ network and stop your carrier (and anyone impersonating them to you) from tracking the
+ device via the cellular radio. The baseband implements other functionality such as
+ Wi-Fi and GPS functionality, but each of these components is separately sandboxed on
+ the baseband and independent of each other. Enabling airplane mode disables the
+ cellular radio, but Wi-Fi can be re-enabled and used without activating the cellular
+ radio again. This allows using the device as a Wi-Fi only device.</p>
+
+ <p>Even if interception of the connection or some other man-in-the-middle attack along
+ the network is not currently occurring, the network is still untrustworthy and
+ information should not be sent unencrypted. Legacy calls and texts should be avoided
+ as they're not secure and trust the carrier / network along with having weak security
+ against other parties. Trying to detect some forms of interception rather than dealing
+ with the root of the problem (unencrypted communications / data transfer) would be
+ foolish and doomed to failure.</p>
+
+ <p>Receiving a silent SMS is not a good indicator of being targeted by your cell
+ carrier, police or government because <em>anyone on the cell network can send
+ them</em> including yourself. Cellular triangulation will happen regardless of whether
+ or not SMS texts are being sent or received by the phone. Even if an SMS did serve a
+ useful purpose for tracking, a silent SMS would be little different than receiving
+ unsolicited spam. In fact, sending spam would be stealthier since it wouldn't trigger
+ alerts for silent SMS but rather would be ignored with the rest of the spam. Regardless,
+ sending texts or other data is not required or particularly useful to track devices
+ connected to a network for an adversary with the appropriate access.</p>
+
<h3 id="default-connections">
<a href="#default-connections">What kind of connections do the OS and bundled apps
make by default?</a>
@@ -338,44 +376,6 @@
</li>
</ul>
- <h3 id="cellular-tracking">
- <a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular tracking and
- silent SMS?</a>
- </h3>
-
- <p>GrapheneOS always considers the network to be hostile and does not implement weak
- or useless mitigations. Therefore, it does not have the assorted gimmicks seen elsewhere
- providing privacy/security theatre to make users feel better about these issues. One
- of the core tenets of GrapheneOS is being honest with users and avoiding scams/frills
- based around marketing rather than real world privacy/security threat models.</p>
-
- <p>Activating airplane mode will fully disable the cellular radio transmit and receive
- capabilities, which will prevent your phone from being reached from the cellular
- network and stop your carrier (and anyone impersonating them to you) from tracking the
- device via the cellular radio. The baseband implements other functionality such as
- Wi-Fi and GPS functionality, but each of these components is separately sandboxed on
- the baseband and independent of each other. Enabling airplane mode disables the
- cellular radio, but Wi-Fi can be re-enabled and used without activating the cellular
- radio again. This allows using the device as a Wi-Fi only device.</p>
-
- <p>Even if interception of the connection or some other man-in-the-middle attack along
- the network is not currently occurring, the network is still untrustworthy and
- information should not be sent unencrypted. Legacy calls and texts should be avoided
- as they're not secure and trust the carrier / network along with having weak security
- against other parties. Trying to detect some forms of interception rather than dealing
- with the root of the problem (unencrypted communications / data transfer) would be
- foolish and doomed to failure.</p>
-
- <p>Receiving a silent SMS is not a good indicator of being targeted by your cell
- carrier, police or government because <em>anyone on the cell network can send
- them</em> including yourself. Cellular triangulation will happen regardless of whether
- or not SMS texts are being sent or received by the phone. Even if an SMS did serve a
- useful purpose for tracking, a silent SMS would be little different than receiving
- unsolicited spam. In fact, sending spam would be stealthier since it wouldn't trigger
- alerts for silent SMS but rather would be ignored with the rest of the spam. Regardless,
- sending texts or other data is not required or particularly useful to track devices
- connected to a network for an adversary with the appropriate access.</p>
-
<h3 id="default-dns">
<a href="#default-dns">Which DNS servers are used by default?</a>
</h3>