diff options
| author | Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> | 2020-03-02 05:16:55 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> | 2020-03-02 05:16:55 -0500 |
| commit | 70fc36a6e2765f2419f4ac36b012166193e0632d (patch) | |
| tree | 2c1e352e7961c4f56348c05fe5e01180e1837ff3 /static | |
| parent | 77b304c92e991d45bf7a533a9afa83f457378fc1 (diff) | |
reorder FAQ
Diffstat (limited to 'static')
| -rw-r--r-- | static/faq.html | 80 |
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/static/faq.html b/static/faq.html index 4933c154..c63ed287 100644 --- a/static/faq.html +++ b/static/faq.html @@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ <ul> <li><a href="#hardware-identifiers">Can apps access hardware identifiers?</a></li> - <li><a href="#default-connections">Which connections do the OS and - bundled apps make by default?</a></li> <li><a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular tracking and silent SMS?</a></li> + <li><a href="#default-connections">Which connections do the OS and + bundled apps make by default?</a></li> <li><a href="#default-dns">Which DNS servers are used by default?</a></li> <li><a href="#custom-dns">How do I use a custom DNS server?</a></li> <li><a href="#private-dns-ip">Why does Private DNS not accept IP @@ -255,6 +255,44 @@ <p>GrapheneOS only makes a small change to remove a legacy form of access to the serial number by legacy apps, which was still around for compatibility.</p> + <h3 id="cellular-tracking"> + <a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular tracking and + silent SMS?</a> + </h3> + + <p>GrapheneOS always considers the network to be hostile and does not implement weak + or useless mitigations. Therefore, it does not have the assorted gimmicks seen elsewhere + providing privacy/security theatre to make users feel better about these issues. One + of the core tenets of GrapheneOS is being honest with users and avoiding scams/frills + based around marketing rather than real world privacy/security threat models.</p> + + <p>Activating airplane mode will fully disable the cellular radio transmit and receive + capabilities, which will prevent your phone from being reached from the cellular + network and stop your carrier (and anyone impersonating them to you) from tracking the + device via the cellular radio. The baseband implements other functionality such as + Wi-Fi and GPS functionality, but each of these components is separately sandboxed on + the baseband and independent of each other. Enabling airplane mode disables the + cellular radio, but Wi-Fi can be re-enabled and used without activating the cellular + radio again. This allows using the device as a Wi-Fi only device.</p> + + <p>Even if interception of the connection or some other man-in-the-middle attack along + the network is not currently occurring, the network is still untrustworthy and + information should not be sent unencrypted. Legacy calls and texts should be avoided + as they're not secure and trust the carrier / network along with having weak security + against other parties. Trying to detect some forms of interception rather than dealing + with the root of the problem (unencrypted communications / data transfer) would be + foolish and doomed to failure.</p> + + <p>Receiving a silent SMS is not a good indicator of being targeted by your cell + carrier, police or government because <em>anyone on the cell network can send + them</em> including yourself. Cellular triangulation will happen regardless of whether + or not SMS texts are being sent or received by the phone. Even if an SMS did serve a + useful purpose for tracking, a silent SMS would be little different than receiving + unsolicited spam. In fact, sending spam would be stealthier since it wouldn't trigger + alerts for silent SMS but rather would be ignored with the rest of the spam. Regardless, + sending texts or other data is not required or particularly useful to track devices + connected to a network for an adversary with the appropriate access.</p> + <h3 id="default-connections"> <a href="#default-connections">What kind of connections do the OS and bundled apps make by default?</a> @@ -338,44 +376,6 @@ </li> </ul> - <h3 id="cellular-tracking"> - <a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular tracking and - silent SMS?</a> - </h3> - - <p>GrapheneOS always considers the network to be hostile and does not implement weak - or useless mitigations. Therefore, it does not have the assorted gimmicks seen elsewhere - providing privacy/security theatre to make users feel better about these issues. One - of the core tenets of GrapheneOS is being honest with users and avoiding scams/frills - based around marketing rather than real world privacy/security threat models.</p> - - <p>Activating airplane mode will fully disable the cellular radio transmit and receive - capabilities, which will prevent your phone from being reached from the cellular - network and stop your carrier (and anyone impersonating them to you) from tracking the - device via the cellular radio. The baseband implements other functionality such as - Wi-Fi and GPS functionality, but each of these components is separately sandboxed on - the baseband and independent of each other. Enabling airplane mode disables the - cellular radio, but Wi-Fi can be re-enabled and used without activating the cellular - radio again. This allows using the device as a Wi-Fi only device.</p> - - <p>Even if interception of the connection or some other man-in-the-middle attack along - the network is not currently occurring, the network is still untrustworthy and - information should not be sent unencrypted. Legacy calls and texts should be avoided - as they're not secure and trust the carrier / network along with having weak security - against other parties. Trying to detect some forms of interception rather than dealing - with the root of the problem (unencrypted communications / data transfer) would be - foolish and doomed to failure.</p> - - <p>Receiving a silent SMS is not a good indicator of being targeted by your cell - carrier, police or government because <em>anyone on the cell network can send - them</em> including yourself. Cellular triangulation will happen regardless of whether - or not SMS texts are being sent or received by the phone. Even if an SMS did serve a - useful purpose for tracking, a silent SMS would be little different than receiving - unsolicited spam. In fact, sending spam would be stealthier since it wouldn't trigger - alerts for silent SMS but rather would be ignored with the rest of the spam. Regardless, - sending texts or other data is not required or particularly useful to track devices - connected to a network for an adversary with the appropriate access.</p> - <h3 id="default-dns"> <a href="#default-dns">Which DNS servers are used by default?</a> </h3> |
