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authorDaniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>2019-05-10 16:23:04 -0400
committerDaniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>2019-05-10 16:26:49 -0400
commit2c376223b08e01341e99d29c76a85ae5a0c35228 (patch)
treed2d747cc3d011f3f3b100cabc97a54fdb247fd5d /static/install.html
parentcf92970605cc1f65bd7f92cb39c3d60fe9583061 (diff)
add section on verifying installation
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@@ -123,6 +123,31 @@ TMPDIR="$PWD/tmp" ./flash-all.sh</pre>
</h2>
<p>OEM unlocking can be disabled again in the developer settings menu within the
operating system after booting it up again.</p>
+ <h2 id="verifying-installation">
+ Verifying installation
+ <a href="#verifying-installation">¶</a>
+ </h2>
+ <p>Verified boot authenticates and validates the firmware images and OS from the
+ hardware root of trust. Since GrapheneOS supports full verified boot, the OS images
+ are entirely verified. However, it's possible that the computer you used to flash the
+ OS was compromised, leading to flashing a malicious verified boot public key and
+ images. To detect this kind of attack, you can use the Auditor app included in
+ GrapheneOS in the Auditee mode and verify it with another Android device in the
+ Auditor mode. The Auditor app works best once it's already paired with a device and
+ has pinned a persistent hardware-backed key and the attestation certificate chain.
+ However, it can still provide a bit of security for the initial verification via the
+ attestation root. Ideally, you should also do this before connecting the device to the
+ network, so an attacker can't proxy to another device (which stops being possible
+ after the initial verification). Further protection against proxying the initial
+ pairing will be provided in the future via support for ID attestation to include the
+ serial number in the hardware verified information to allow checking against the one
+ on the box / displayed in the bootloader. See the
+ <a href="https://attestation.app/tutorial">Auditor tutorial</a> for a guide.</p>
+ <p>After the initial verification, which results in pairing, performing verification
+ against between the same Auditor and Auditee (as long as the app data hasn't been
+ cleared) will provide strong validation of the identity and integrity of the
+ device. That makes it best to get the pairing done right after installation. You can
+ also consider setting up the optional remote attestation service.</p>
<h2 id="replacing-grapheneos-with-the-stock-os">
Replacing GrapheneOS with the stock OS
<a href="#replacing-grapheneos-with-the-stock-os">¶</a>