diff options
| author | r3g_5z <june@girlboss.ceo> | 2023-01-08 22:23:22 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> | 2023-01-12 17:48:15 -0500 |
| commit | b93d86fca1851614d8fb29d9302e2322978af159 (patch) | |
| tree | 0e6757a26503d1bbb1017fd359c99b7d27211caf | |
| parent | 883505ec12e485726b5498bdc398d1e1c4afbb00 (diff) | |
Add more various misc features
Signed-off-by: r3g_5z <june@girlboss.ceo>
| -rw-r--r-- | static/features.html | 26 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/static/features.html b/static/features.html index 707446a4..152343c7 100644 --- a/static/features.html +++ b/static/features.html @@ -338,11 +338,11 @@ including many which we played a part in developing and landing upstream as part of our linux-hardened project (which we intend to revive as a more active project again).</li> - <li>Forced kernel module signing with per-build keys and - lockdown mode set to forced confidentiality mode help to - enforce a low-level boundary between the kernel and userspace - even if mistakes are made in SELinux policy or there's a deep - userspace compromise.</li> + <li>Forced kernel module signing with per-build RSA 4096 / + SHA256 keys and lockdown mode set to forced confidentiality + mode help to enforce a low-level boundary between the kernel + and userspace even if mistakes are made in SELinux policy or + there's a deep userspace compromise.</li> <li>Additional consistency / integrity checks are enabled for frequently targeted kernel data structures.</li> </ul> @@ -815,8 +815,8 @@ <h3><a href="#grapheneos-pdf-viewer">GrapheneOS PDF Viewer</a></h3> <p><a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer">GrapheneOS PDF Viewer</a> - is sandboxed, hardened PDF viewer using HiDPI rendering with pinch to zoom, - text selection, etc.</p> + is a sandboxed, hardened PDF viewer using HiDPI rendering with features like + pinch to zoom, text selection, viewing encrypted PDFs, etc.</p> </section> <section id="encrypted-backups"> @@ -902,6 +902,18 @@ useful in Canada where the government abuses the system and sends every type of alert as a presidential alert to stop users from being able to opt out of weather and amber alerts.</li> + <li>Removal of TrustCor root certificate authority as a trusted system CA.</li> + <li>Secure-by-default Android 12 PendingIntent security check (FLAG_IMMUTABLE) + instead of crash-by-default improving older app compatibility and security.</li> + <li>Fixed UART debugging enabled warning on offical release builds.</li> + <li>Engineering / Prototype ("EVT", "PVT" or "DVT") device warning as these + devices typically have relaxed security controls for development, mainly + the secure boot state property <code>ro.boot.secure_boot</code> not set + to <code>PRODUCTION</code>.</li> + <li>Enable bootloader, radio, and boot partition version / fingerprint + checks.</li> + <li>Remove code automatically granting the location permission to system + browsers.</li> </ul> </section> </section> |
