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package fst
import (
"errors"
"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/dbus"
"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/helper/bwrap"
"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/internal/linux"
"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/internal/system"
)
const Tmp = "/.fortify"
// Config is used to seal an *App
type Config struct {
// application ID
ID string `json:"id"`
// value passed through to the child process as its argv
Command []string `json:"command"`
Confinement ConfinementConfig `json:"confinement"`
}
// ConfinementConfig defines fortified child's confinement
type ConfinementConfig struct {
// numerical application id, determines uid in the init namespace
AppID int `json:"app_id"`
// list of supplementary groups to inherit
Groups []string `json:"groups"`
// passwd username in the sandbox, defaults to passwd name of target uid or chronos
Username string `json:"username,omitempty"`
// home directory in sandbox, empty for outer
Inner string `json:"home_inner"`
// home directory in init namespace
Outer string `json:"home"`
// bwrap sandbox confinement configuration
Sandbox *SandboxConfig `json:"sandbox"`
// extra acl entries to append
ExtraPerms []*ExtraPermConfig `json:"extra_perms,omitempty"`
// reference to a system D-Bus proxy configuration,
// nil value disables system bus proxy
SystemBus *dbus.Config `json:"system_bus,omitempty"`
// reference to a session D-Bus proxy configuration,
// nil value makes session bus proxy assume built-in defaults
SessionBus *dbus.Config `json:"session_bus,omitempty"`
// system resources to expose to the sandbox
Enablements system.Enablements `json:"enablements"`
}
// SandboxConfig describes resources made available to the sandbox.
type SandboxConfig struct {
// unix hostname within sandbox
Hostname string `json:"hostname,omitempty"`
// allow userns within sandbox
UserNS bool `json:"userns,omitempty"`
// share net namespace
Net bool `json:"net,omitempty"`
// share all devices
Dev bool `json:"dev,omitempty"`
// do not run in new session
NoNewSession bool `json:"no_new_session,omitempty"`
// map target user uid to privileged user uid in the user namespace
MapRealUID bool `json:"map_real_uid"`
// direct access to wayland socket
DirectWayland bool `json:"direct_wayland,omitempty"`
// final environment variables
Env map[string]string `json:"env"`
// sandbox host filesystem access
Filesystem []*FilesystemConfig `json:"filesystem"`
// symlinks created inside the sandbox
Link [][2]string `json:"symlink"`
// read-only /etc directory
Etc string `json:"etc,omitempty"`
// automatically set up /etc symlinks
AutoEtc bool `json:"auto_etc"`
// paths to override by mounting tmpfs over them
Override []string `json:"override"`
}
type ExtraPermConfig struct {
Ensure bool `json:"ensure,omitempty"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Read bool `json:"r,omitempty"`
Write bool `json:"w,omitempty"`
Execute bool `json:"x,omitempty"`
}
func (e *ExtraPermConfig) String() string {
buf := make([]byte, 0, 5+len(e.Path))
buf = append(buf, '-', '-', '-')
if e.Ensure {
buf = append(buf, '+')
}
buf = append(buf, ':')
buf = append(buf, []byte(e.Path)...)
if e.Read {
buf[0] = 'r'
}
if e.Write {
buf[1] = 'w'
}
if e.Execute {
buf[2] = 'x'
}
return string(buf)
}
type FilesystemConfig struct {
// mount point in sandbox, same as src if empty
Dst string `json:"dst,omitempty"`
// host filesystem path to make available to sandbox
Src string `json:"src"`
// write access
Write bool `json:"write,omitempty"`
// device access
Device bool `json:"dev,omitempty"`
// fail if mount fails
Must bool `json:"require,omitempty"`
}
// Bwrap returns the address of the corresponding bwrap.Config to s.
// Note that remaining tmpfs entries must be queued by the caller prior to launch.
func (s *SandboxConfig) Bwrap(os linux.System) (*bwrap.Config, error) {
if s == nil {
return nil, errors.New("nil sandbox config")
}
var uid int
if !s.MapRealUID {
uid = 65534
} else {
uid = os.Geteuid()
}
conf := (&bwrap.Config{
Net: s.Net,
UserNS: s.UserNS,
Hostname: s.Hostname,
Clearenv: true,
SetEnv: s.Env,
NewSession: !s.NoNewSession,
DieWithParent: true,
AsInit: true,
// initialise map
Chmod: make(bwrap.ChmodConfig),
}).
SetUID(uid).SetGID(uid).
Procfs("/proc").
Tmpfs(Tmp, 4*1024)
if !s.Dev {
conf.DevTmpfs("/dev").Mqueue("/dev/mqueue")
} else {
conf.Bind("/dev", "/dev", false, true, true)
}
if !s.AutoEtc {
if s.Etc == "" {
conf.Dir("/etc")
} else {
conf.Bind(s.Etc, "/etc")
}
}
for _, c := range s.Filesystem {
if c == nil {
continue
}
src := c.Src
dest := c.Dst
if c.Dst == "" {
dest = c.Src
}
conf.Bind(src, dest, !c.Must, c.Write, c.Device)
}
for _, l := range s.Link {
conf.Symlink(l[0], l[1])
}
if s.AutoEtc {
etc := s.Etc
if etc == "" {
etc = "/etc"
}
conf.Bind(etc, Tmp+"/etc")
// link host /etc contents to prevent passwd/group from being overwritten
if d, err := os.ReadDir(etc); err != nil {
return nil, err
} else {
for _, ent := range d {
name := ent.Name()
switch name {
case "passwd":
case "group":
case "mtab":
conf.Symlink("/proc/mounts", "/etc/"+name)
default:
conf.Symlink(Tmp+"/etc/"+name, "/etc/"+name)
}
}
}
}
return conf, nil
}
// Template returns a fully populated instance of Config.
func Template() *Config {
return &Config{
ID: "org.chromium.Chromium",
Command: []string{
"chromium",
"--ignore-gpu-blocklist",
"--disable-smooth-scrolling",
"--enable-features=UseOzonePlatform",
"--ozone-platform=wayland",
},
Confinement: ConfinementConfig{
AppID: 9,
Groups: []string{"video"},
Username: "chronos",
Outer: "/var/lib/persist/home/org.chromium.Chromium",
Inner: "/var/lib/fortify",
Sandbox: &SandboxConfig{
Hostname: "localhost",
UserNS: true,
Net: true,
NoNewSession: true,
MapRealUID: true,
Dev: true,
DirectWayland: false,
// example API credentials pulled from Google Chrome
// DO NOT USE THESE IN A REAL BROWSER
Env: map[string]string{
"GOOGLE_API_KEY": "AIzaSyBHDrl33hwRp4rMQY0ziRbj8K9LPA6vUCY",
"GOOGLE_DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID": "77185425430.apps.googleusercontent.com",
"GOOGLE_DEFAULT_CLIENT_SECRET": "OTJgUOQcT7lO7GsGZq2G4IlT",
},
Filesystem: []*FilesystemConfig{
{Src: "/nix/store"},
{Src: "/run/current-system"},
{Src: "/run/opengl-driver"},
{Src: "/var/db/nix-channels"},
{Src: "/home/chronos", Write: true, Must: true},
{Src: "/dev/dri", Device: true},
},
Link: [][2]string{{"/run/user/65534", "/run/user/150"}},
Etc: "/etc",
AutoEtc: true,
Override: []string{"/var/run/nscd"},
},
SystemBus: &dbus.Config{
See: nil,
Talk: []string{"org.bluez", "org.freedesktop.Avahi", "org.freedesktop.UPower"},
Own: nil,
Call: nil,
Broadcast: nil,
Log: false,
Filter: true,
},
SessionBus: &dbus.Config{
See: nil,
Talk: []string{"org.freedesktop.Notifications", "org.freedesktop.FileManager1", "org.freedesktop.ScreenSaver",
"org.freedesktop.secrets", "org.kde.kwalletd5", "org.kde.kwalletd6", "org.gnome.SessionManager"},
Own: []string{"org.chromium.Chromium.*", "org.mpris.MediaPlayer2.org.chromium.Chromium.*",
"org.mpris.MediaPlayer2.chromium.*"},
Call: map[string]string{"org.freedesktop.portal.*": "*"},
Broadcast: map[string]string{"org.freedesktop.portal.*": "@/org/freedesktop/portal/*"},
Log: false,
Filter: true,
},
Enablements: system.EWayland.Mask() | system.EDBus.Mask() | system.EPulse.Mask(),
},
}
}
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