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package container
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"os"
"os/exec"
"os/signal"
"path"
"runtime"
"strconv"
. "syscall"
"time"
"hakurei.app/container/seccomp"
)
const (
/* intermediate tmpfs mount point
this path might seem like a weird choice, however there are many good reasons to use it:
- the contents of this path is never exposed to the container:
the tmpfs root established here effectively becomes anonymous after pivot_root
- it is safe to assume this path exists and is a directory:
this program will not work correctly without a proper /proc and neither will most others
- this path belongs to the container init:
the container init is not any more privileged or trusted than the rest of the container
- this path is only accessible by init and root:
the container init sets SUID_DUMP_DISABLE and terminates if that fails;
it should be noted that none of this should become relevant at any point since the resulting
intermediate root tmpfs should be effectively anonymous */
intermediateHostPath = FHSProc + "self/fd"
// setup params file descriptor
setupEnv = "HAKUREI_SETUP"
)
type initParams struct {
Params
HostUid, HostGid int
// extra files count
Count int
// verbosity pass through
Verbose bool
}
func Init(prepare func(prefix string), setVerbose func(verbose bool)) {
runtime.LockOSThread()
prepare("init")
if os.Getpid() != 1 {
log.Fatal("this process must run as pid 1")
}
if err := SetPtracer(0); err != nil {
msg.Verbosef("cannot enable ptrace protection via Yama LSM: %v", err)
// not fatal: this program has no additional privileges at initial program start
}
var (
params initParams
closeSetup func() error
setupFile *os.File
offsetSetup int
)
if f, err := Receive(setupEnv, ¶ms, &setupFile); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, EBADF) {
log.Fatal("invalid setup descriptor")
}
if errors.Is(err, ErrNotSet) {
log.Fatal("HAKUREI_SETUP not set")
}
log.Fatalf("cannot decode init setup payload: %v", err)
} else {
if params.Ops == nil {
log.Fatal("invalid setup parameters")
}
if params.ParentPerm == 0 {
params.ParentPerm = 0755
}
setVerbose(params.Verbose)
msg.Verbose("received setup parameters")
closeSetup = f
offsetSetup = int(setupFile.Fd() + 1)
}
// write uid/gid map here so parent does not need to set dumpable
if err := SetDumpable(SUID_DUMP_USER); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot set SUID_DUMP_USER: %s", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(FHSProc+"self/uid_map",
append([]byte{}, strconv.Itoa(params.Uid)+" "+strconv.Itoa(params.HostUid)+" 1\n"...),
0); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(FHSProc+"self/setgroups",
[]byte("deny\n"),
0); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(FHSProc+"self/gid_map",
append([]byte{}, strconv.Itoa(params.Gid)+" "+strconv.Itoa(params.HostGid)+" 1\n"...),
0); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
if err := SetDumpable(SUID_DUMP_DISABLE); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot set SUID_DUMP_DISABLE: %s", err)
}
oldmask := Umask(0)
if params.Hostname != "" {
if err := Sethostname([]byte(params.Hostname)); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot set hostname: %v", err)
}
}
// cache sysctl before pivot_root
LastCap()
if err := Mount(zeroString, FHSRoot, zeroString, MS_SILENT|MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, zeroString); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot make / rslave: %v", err)
}
state := &setupState{Params: ¶ms.Params}
/* early is called right before pivot_root into intermediate root;
this step is mostly for gathering information that would otherwise be difficult to obtain
via library functions after pivot_root, and implementations are expected to avoid changing
the state of the mount namespace */
for i, op := range *params.Ops {
if op == nil {
log.Fatalf("invalid op %d", i)
}
if err := op.early(state); err != nil {
msg.PrintBaseErr(err,
fmt.Sprintf("cannot prepare op %d:", i))
msg.BeforeExit()
os.Exit(1)
}
}
if err := Mount(SourceTmpfsRootfs, intermediateHostPath, FstypeTmpfs, MS_NODEV|MS_NOSUID, zeroString); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot mount intermediate root: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Chdir(intermediateHostPath); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot enter base path: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Mkdir(sysrootDir, 0755); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
if err := Mount(sysrootDir, sysrootDir, zeroString, MS_SILENT|MS_BIND|MS_REC, zeroString); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot bind sysroot: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Mkdir(hostDir, 0755); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
// pivot_root uncovers intermediateHostPath in hostDir
if err := PivotRoot(intermediateHostPath, hostDir); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot pivot into intermediate root: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Chdir(FHSRoot); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
/* apply is called right after pivot_root and entering the new root;
this step sets up the container filesystem, and implementations are expected to keep the host root
and sysroot mount points intact but otherwise can do whatever they need to;
chdir is allowed but discouraged */
for i, op := range *params.Ops {
// ops already checked during early setup
msg.Verbosef("%s %s", op.prefix(), op)
if err := op.apply(state); err != nil {
msg.PrintBaseErr(err,
fmt.Sprintf("cannot apply op %d:", i))
msg.BeforeExit()
os.Exit(1)
}
}
// setup requiring host root complete at this point
if err := Mount(hostDir, hostDir, zeroString, MS_SILENT|MS_REC|MS_PRIVATE, zeroString); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot make host root rprivate: %v", err)
}
if err := Unmount(hostDir, MNT_DETACH); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot unmount host root: %v", err)
}
{
var fd int
if err := IgnoringEINTR(func() (err error) {
fd, err = Open(FHSRoot, O_DIRECTORY|O_RDONLY, 0)
return
}); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot open intermediate root: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Chdir(sysrootPath); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
if err := PivotRoot(".", "."); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot pivot into sysroot: %v", err)
}
if err := Fchdir(fd); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot re-enter intermediate root: %v", err)
}
if err := Unmount(".", MNT_DETACH); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot unmount intemediate root: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Chdir(FHSRoot); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
if err := Close(fd); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot close intermediate root: %v", err)
}
}
if _, _, errno := Syscall(SYS_PRCTL, PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL, 0); errno != 0 {
log.Fatalf("cannot clear the ambient capability set: %v", errno)
}
for i := uintptr(0); i <= LastCap(); i++ {
if params.Privileged && i == CAP_SYS_ADMIN {
continue
}
if _, _, errno := Syscall(SYS_PRCTL, PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i, 0); errno != 0 {
log.Fatalf("cannot drop capability from bonding set: %v", errno)
}
}
var keep [2]uint32
if params.Privileged {
keep[capToIndex(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)] |= capToMask(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
if _, _, errno := Syscall(SYS_PRCTL, PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); errno != 0 {
log.Fatalf("cannot raise CAP_SYS_ADMIN: %v", errno)
}
}
if err := capset(
&capHeader{_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, 0},
&[2]capData{{0, keep[0], keep[0]}, {0, keep[1], keep[1]}},
); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cannot capset: %v", err)
}
if !params.SeccompDisable {
rules := params.SeccompRules
if len(rules) == 0 { // non-empty rules slice always overrides presets
msg.Verbosef("resolving presets %#x", params.SeccompPresets)
rules = seccomp.Preset(params.SeccompPresets, params.SeccompFlags)
}
if err := seccomp.Load(rules, params.SeccompFlags); err != nil {
// this also indirectly asserts PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
log.Fatalf("cannot load syscall filter: %v", err)
}
msg.Verbosef("%d filter rules loaded", len(rules))
} else {
msg.Verbose("syscall filter not configured")
}
extraFiles := make([]*os.File, params.Count)
for i := range extraFiles {
// setup fd is placed before all extra files
extraFiles[i] = os.NewFile(uintptr(offsetSetup+i), "extra file "+strconv.Itoa(i))
}
Umask(oldmask)
cmd := exec.Command(params.Path.String())
cmd.Stdin, cmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = os.Stdin, os.Stdout, os.Stderr
cmd.Args = params.Args
cmd.Env = params.Env
cmd.ExtraFiles = extraFiles
cmd.Dir = params.Dir.String()
msg.Verbosef("starting initial program %s", params.Path)
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
msg.Suspend()
if err := closeSetup(); err != nil {
log.Printf("cannot close setup pipe: %v", err)
// not fatal
}
type winfo struct {
wpid int
wstatus WaitStatus
}
info := make(chan winfo, 1)
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
var (
err error
wpid = -2
wstatus WaitStatus
)
// keep going until no child process is left
for wpid != -1 {
if err != nil {
break
}
if wpid != -2 {
info <- winfo{wpid, wstatus}
}
err = EINTR
for errors.Is(err, EINTR) {
wpid, err = Wait4(-1, &wstatus, 0, nil)
}
}
if !errors.Is(err, ECHILD) {
log.Printf("unexpected wait4 response: %v", err)
}
close(done)
}()
// handle signals to dump withheld messages
sig := make(chan os.Signal, 2)
signal.Notify(sig, os.Interrupt, CancelSignal)
// closed after residualProcessTimeout has elapsed after initial process death
timeout := make(chan struct{})
r := 2
for {
select {
case s := <-sig:
if msg.Resume() {
msg.Verbosef("%s after process start", s.String())
} else {
msg.Verbosef("got %s", s.String())
}
if s == CancelSignal && params.ForwardCancel && cmd.Process != nil {
msg.Verbose("forwarding context cancellation")
if err := cmd.Process.Signal(os.Interrupt); err != nil {
log.Printf("cannot forward cancellation: %v", err)
}
continue
}
os.Exit(0)
case w := <-info:
if w.wpid == cmd.Process.Pid {
// initial process exited, output is most likely available again
msg.Resume()
switch {
case w.wstatus.Exited():
r = w.wstatus.ExitStatus()
msg.Verbosef("initial process exited with code %d", w.wstatus.ExitStatus())
case w.wstatus.Signaled():
r = 128 + int(w.wstatus.Signal())
msg.Verbosef("initial process exited with signal %s", w.wstatus.Signal())
default:
r = 255
msg.Verbosef("initial process exited with status %#x", w.wstatus)
}
go func() { time.Sleep(params.AdoptWaitDelay); close(timeout) }()
}
case <-done:
msg.BeforeExit()
os.Exit(r)
case <-timeout:
log.Println("timeout exceeded waiting for lingering processes")
msg.BeforeExit()
os.Exit(r)
}
}
}
const initName = "init"
// TryArgv0 calls [Init] if the last element of argv0 is "init".
func TryArgv0(v Msg, prepare func(prefix string), setVerbose func(verbose bool)) {
if len(os.Args) > 0 && path.Base(os.Args[0]) == initName {
msg = v
Init(prepare, setVerbose)
msg.BeforeExit()
os.Exit(0)
}
}
|