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This limits potential exploits to the fortify uid range.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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Should be able to get rid of XDG_RUNTIME_DIR share after this.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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Getting killed at this point will result in inconsistent state.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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This provides user records via nss-systemd. Static drop-in entries are generated to reduce complexity and attack surface.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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This removes the dependency on external user switchers like sudo/machinectl and decouples fortify user ids from the passwd database.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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This message eventually gets returned by the app's Start method, so they should be wrapped to provide a friendly message.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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This change also fixes a deadlock when shim fails to connect and complete the setup.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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Only allow main program to launch fsu. This change and further checks in the main program reduces attack surface.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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Contains path to fortify, set at compile time, authenticates based on a simple uid range assignment file which also acts as the allow list.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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