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Fortify makes little sense for a container tool.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk>
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The socket-based approach is no longer necessary as fsu allows extra files and sudo compatibility is no longer relevant.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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This limits potential exploits to the fortify uid range.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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This removes the dependency on external user switchers like sudo/machinectl and decouples fortify user ids from the passwd database.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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This change also fixes a deadlock when shim fails to connect and complete the setup.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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Only allow main program to launch fsu. This change and further checks in the main program reduces attack surface.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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Contains path to fortify, set at compile time, authenticates based on a simple uid range assignment file which also acts as the allow list.
Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
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