diff options
| author | Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk> | 2025-03-17 02:55:36 +0900 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk> | 2025-03-17 02:55:36 +0900 |
| commit | 24618ab9a1524e8b8986a9bf67667288e642fcf1 (patch) | |
| tree | b3f2a71a2c9bedf937d0fec00092ad9133cb3ec9 /sandbox/container.go | |
| parent | 9ce4706a0766880c072cccd2643d66f614a6a16b (diff) | |
sandbox: move out of internal
Signed-off-by: Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'sandbox/container.go')
| -rw-r--r-- | sandbox/container.go | 232 |
1 files changed, 232 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sandbox/container.go b/sandbox/container.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c8063ce --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/container.go @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/gob" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path" + "strconv" + "syscall" + "time" + + "git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/sandbox/seccomp" +) + +type HardeningFlags uintptr + +const ( + FSyscallCompat HardeningFlags = 1 << iota + FAllowDevel + FAllowUserns + FAllowTTY + FAllowNet +) + +func (flags HardeningFlags) seccomp(opts seccomp.SyscallOpts) seccomp.SyscallOpts { + if flags&FSyscallCompat == 0 { + opts |= seccomp.FlagExt + } + if flags&FAllowDevel == 0 { + opts |= seccomp.FlagDenyDevel + } + if flags&FAllowUserns == 0 { + opts |= seccomp.FlagDenyNS + } + if flags&FAllowTTY == 0 { + opts |= seccomp.FlagDenyTTY + } + return opts +} + +type ( + // Container represents a container environment being prepared or run. + // None of [Container] methods are safe for concurrent use. + Container struct { + // Name of initial process in the container. + name string + // Cgroup fd, nil to disable. + Cgroup *int + // ExtraFiles passed through to initial process in the container, + // with behaviour identical to its [exec.Cmd] counterpart. + ExtraFiles []*os.File + + InitParams + // Custom [exec.Cmd] initialisation function. + CommandContext func(ctx context.Context) (cmd *exec.Cmd) + + // param encoder for shim and init + setup *gob.Encoder + // cancels cmd + cancel context.CancelFunc + + Stdin io.Reader + Stdout io.Writer + Stderr io.Writer + + Cancel func() error + WaitDelay time.Duration + + cmd *exec.Cmd + ctx context.Context + } + + InitParams struct { + // Working directory in the container. + Dir string + // Initial process environment. + Env []string + // Absolute path of initial process in the container. Overrides name. + Path string + // Initial process argv. + Args []string + + // Mapped Uid in user namespace. + Uid int + // Mapped Gid in user namespace. + Gid int + // Hostname value in UTS namespace. + Hostname string + // Sequential container setup ops. + *Ops + // Extra seccomp options. + Seccomp seccomp.SyscallOpts + + Flags HardeningFlags + } + + Ops []Op + Op interface { + apply(params *InitParams) error + + Is(op Op) bool + fmt.Stringer + } +) + +func (p *Container) Start() error { + if p.cmd != nil { + return errors.New("sandbox: already started") + } + if p.Ops == nil || len(*p.Ops) == 0 { + return errors.New("sandbox: starting an empty container") + } + + ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(p.ctx) + p.cancel = cancel + + var cloneFlags uintptr = syscall.CLONE_NEWIPC | + syscall.CLONE_NEWUTS | + syscall.CLONE_NEWCGROUP + if p.Flags&FAllowNet == 0 { + cloneFlags |= syscall.CLONE_NEWNET + } + + // map to overflow id to work around ownership checks + if p.Uid < 1 { + p.Uid = OverflowUid() + } + if p.Gid < 1 { + p.Gid = OverflowGid() + } + + if p.CommandContext != nil { + p.cmd = p.CommandContext(ctx) + } else { + p.cmd = exec.CommandContext(ctx, MustExecutable()) + p.cmd.Args = []string{"init"} + } + + p.cmd.Stdin, p.cmd.Stdout, p.cmd.Stderr = p.Stdin, p.Stdout, p.Stderr + p.cmd.Cancel, p.cmd.WaitDelay = p.Cancel, p.WaitDelay + p.cmd.Dir = "/" + p.cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{ + Setsid: p.Flags&FAllowTTY == 0, + Pdeathsig: syscall.SIGKILL, + + Cloneflags: cloneFlags | + syscall.CLONE_NEWUSER | + syscall.CLONE_NEWPID | + syscall.CLONE_NEWNS, + + // remain privileged for setup + AmbientCaps: []uintptr{CAP_SYS_ADMIN}, + + UseCgroupFD: p.Cgroup != nil, + } + if p.cmd.SysProcAttr.UseCgroupFD { + p.cmd.SysProcAttr.CgroupFD = *p.Cgroup + } + + // place setup pipe before user supplied extra files, this is later restored by init + if fd, e, err := Setup(&p.cmd.ExtraFiles); err != nil { + return wrapErrSuffix(err, + "cannot create shim setup pipe:") + } else { + p.setup = e + p.cmd.Env = []string{setupEnv + "=" + strconv.Itoa(fd)} + } + p.cmd.ExtraFiles = append(p.cmd.ExtraFiles, p.ExtraFiles...) + + msg.Verbose("starting container init") + if err := p.cmd.Start(); err != nil { + return msg.WrapErr(err, err.Error()) + } + return nil +} + +func (p *Container) Serve() error { + if p.setup == nil { + panic("invalid serve") + } + + if p.Path != "" && !path.IsAbs(p.Path) { + return msg.WrapErr(syscall.EINVAL, + fmt.Sprintf("invalid executable path %q", p.Path)) + } + + if p.Path == "" { + if p.name == "" { + p.Path = os.Getenv("SHELL") + if !path.IsAbs(p.Path) { + return msg.WrapErr(syscall.EBADE, + "no command specified and $SHELL is invalid") + } + p.name = path.Base(p.Path) + } else if path.IsAbs(p.name) { + p.Path = p.name + } else if v, err := exec.LookPath(p.name); err != nil { + return msg.WrapErr(err, err.Error()) + } else { + p.Path = v + } + } + + setup := p.setup + p.setup = nil + return setup.Encode( + &initParams{ + p.InitParams, + syscall.Getuid(), + syscall.Getgid(), + len(p.ExtraFiles), + msg.IsVerbose(), + }, + ) +} + +func (p *Container) Wait() error { defer p.cancel(); return p.cmd.Wait() } + +func (p *Container) String() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("argv: %q, flags: %#x, seccomp: %#x", + p.Args, p.Flags, int(p.Flags.seccomp(p.Seccomp))) +} + +func New(ctx context.Context, name string, args ...string) *Container { + return &Container{name: name, ctx: ctx, + InitParams: InitParams{Args: append([]string{name}, args...), Dir: "/", Ops: new(Ops)}, + } +} |
