seccomp: move out of helper

Signed-off-by: Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk>

9 files changed, 2 insertions, 783 deletions

diff --git a/helper/bwrap/config_test.go b/helper/bwrap/config_test.go
index e0f14511..678f49de 100644
--- a/helper/bwrap/config_test.go
+++ b/helper/bwrap/config_test.go
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
 
 	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/helper/bwrap"
 	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/helper/proc"
-	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/helper/seccomp"
+	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/seccomp"
 )
 
 func TestConfig_Args(t *testing.T) {
diff --git a/helper/bwrap/seccomp.go b/helper/bwrap/seccomp.go
index f74015fd..8e55171b 100644
--- a/helper/bwrap/seccomp.go
+++ b/helper/bwrap/seccomp.go
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"strconv"
 
 	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/helper/proc"
-	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/helper/seccomp"
+	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/seccomp"
 )
 
 type SyscallPolicy struct {
diff --git a/helper/seccomp/api.go b/helper/seccomp/api.go
deleted file mode 100644
index 697b09f3..00000000
--- a/helper/seccomp/api.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-package seccomp
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"syscall"
-
-	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/helper/proc"
-)
-
-// New returns an inactive Encoder instance.
-func New(opts SyscallOpts) *Encoder { return &Encoder{newExporter(opts)} }
-
-// Load loads a filter into the kernel.
-func Load(opts SyscallOpts) error { return buildFilter(-1, opts) }
-
-/*
-An Encoder writes a BPF program to an output stream.
-
-Methods of Encoder are not safe for concurrent use.
-
-An Encoder must not be copied after first use.
-*/
-type Encoder struct {
-	*exporter
-}
-
-func (e *Encoder) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
-	if err = e.prepare(); err != nil {
-		return
-	}
-	return e.r.Read(p)
-}
-
-func (e *Encoder) Close() error {
-	if e.r == nil {
-		return syscall.EINVAL
-	}
-
-	// this hangs if the cgo thread fails to exit
-	return errors.Join(e.closeWrite(), <-e.exportErr)
-}
-
-// NewFile returns an instance of exporter implementing [proc.File].
-func NewFile(opts SyscallOpts) proc.File { return &File{opts: opts} }
-
-// File implements [proc.File] and provides access to the read end of exporter pipe.
-type File struct {
-	opts SyscallOpts
-	proc.BaseFile
-}
-
-func (f *File) ErrCount() int { return 2 }
-func (f *File) Fulfill(ctx context.Context, dispatchErr func(error)) error {
-	e := newExporter(f.opts)
-	if err := e.prepare(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	f.Set(e.r)
-	go func() {
-		select {
-		case err := <-e.exportErr:
-			dispatchErr(nil)
-			dispatchErr(err)
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			dispatchErr(e.closeWrite())
-			dispatchErr(<-e.exportErr)
-		}
-	}()
-	return nil
-}
diff --git a/helper/seccomp/export.go b/helper/seccomp/export.go
deleted file mode 100644
index 95684235..00000000
--- a/helper/seccomp/export.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-package seccomp
-
-import (
-	"os"
-	"runtime"
-	"sync"
-)
-
-type exporter struct {
-	opts SyscallOpts
-	r, w *os.File
-
-	prepareOnce sync.Once
-	prepareErr  error
-	closeOnce   sync.Once
-	closeErr    error
-	exportErr   <-chan error
-}
-
-func (e *exporter) prepare() error {
-	e.prepareOnce.Do(func() {
-		if r, w, err := os.Pipe(); err != nil {
-			e.prepareErr = err
-			return
-		} else {
-			e.r, e.w = r, w
-		}
-
-		ec := make(chan error, 1)
-		go func(fd uintptr) {
-			ec <- buildFilter(int(fd), e.opts)
-			close(ec)
-			_ = e.closeWrite()
-			runtime.KeepAlive(e.w)
-		}(e.w.Fd())
-		e.exportErr = ec
-		runtime.SetFinalizer(e, (*exporter).closeWrite)
-	})
-	return e.prepareErr
-}
-
-func (e *exporter) closeWrite() error {
-	e.closeOnce.Do(func() {
-		if e.w == nil {
-			panic("closeWrite called on invalid exporter")
-		}
-		e.closeErr = e.w.Close()
-
-		// no need for a finalizer anymore
-		runtime.SetFinalizer(e, nil)
-	})
-
-	return e.closeErr
-}
-
-func newExporter(opts SyscallOpts) *exporter {
-	return &exporter{opts: opts}
-}
diff --git a/helper/seccomp/export_test.go b/helper/seccomp/export_test.go
deleted file mode 100644
index ff6f250e..00000000
--- a/helper/seccomp/export_test.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
-package seccomp_test
-
-import (
-	"crypto/sha512"
-	"errors"
-	"io"
-	"log"
-	"slices"
-	"syscall"
-	"testing"
-
-	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/helper/seccomp"
-)
-
-func TestExport(t *testing.T) {
-	testCases := []struct {
-		name    string
-		opts    seccomp.SyscallOpts
-		want    []byte
-		wantErr bool
-	}{
-		{"compat", 0, []byte{
-			0x95, 0xec, 0x69, 0xd0, 0x17, 0x73, 0x3e, 0x07,
-			0x21, 0x60, 0xe0, 0xda, 0x80, 0xfd, 0xeb, 0xec,
-			0xdf, 0x27, 0xae, 0x81, 0x66, 0xf5, 0xe2, 0xa7,
-			0x31, 0x27, 0x0c, 0x98, 0xea, 0x2d, 0x29, 0x46,
-			0xcb, 0x52, 0x31, 0x02, 0x90, 0x63, 0x66, 0x8a,
-			0xf2, 0x15, 0x87, 0x91, 0x55, 0xda, 0x21, 0xac,
-			0xa7, 0x9b, 0x07, 0x0e, 0x04, 0xc0, 0xee, 0x9a,
-			0xcd, 0xf5, 0x8f, 0x55, 0xcf, 0xa8, 0x15, 0xa5,
-		}, false},
-		{"base", seccomp.FlagExt, []byte{
-			0xdc, 0x7f, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0x5e, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x79,
-			0xeb, 0xb7, 0xef, 0xc7, 0x59, 0x15, 0x0f, 0x54,
-			0xa8, 0x3a, 0x75, 0xc8, 0xdf, 0x6f, 0xee, 0x4d,
-			0xce, 0x5d, 0xad, 0xc4, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x58, 0x5d,
-			0x4d, 0xee, 0xbf, 0xeb, 0x3c, 0x79, 0x69, 0xaf,
-			0x3a, 0x07, 0x7e, 0x90, 0xb7, 0x7b, 0xb4, 0x74,
-			0x1d, 0xb0, 0x5d, 0x90, 0x99, 0x7c, 0x86, 0x59,
-			0xb9, 0x58, 0x91, 0x20, 0x6a, 0xc9, 0x95, 0x2d,
-		}, false},
-		{"everything", seccomp.FlagExt |
-			seccomp.FlagDenyNS | seccomp.FlagDenyTTY | seccomp.FlagDenyDevel |
-			seccomp.FlagMultiarch | seccomp.FlagLinux32 | seccomp.FlagCan |
-			seccomp.FlagBluetooth, []byte{
-			0xe9, 0x9d, 0xd3, 0x45, 0xe1, 0x95, 0x41, 0x34,
-			0x73, 0xd3, 0xcb, 0xee, 0x07, 0xb4, 0xed, 0x57,
-			0xb9, 0x08, 0xbf, 0xa8, 0x9e, 0xa2, 0x07, 0x2f,
-			0xe9, 0x34, 0x82, 0x84, 0x7f, 0x50, 0xb5, 0xb7,
-			0x58, 0xda, 0x17, 0xe7, 0x4c, 0xa2, 0xbb, 0xc0,
-			0x08, 0x13, 0xde, 0x49, 0xa2, 0xb9, 0xbf, 0x83,
-			0x4c, 0x02, 0x4e, 0xd4, 0x88, 0x50, 0xbe, 0x69,
-			0xb6, 0x8a, 0x9a, 0x4c, 0x5f, 0x53, 0xa9, 0xdb,
-		}, false},
-		{"strict", seccomp.FlagExt |
-			seccomp.FlagDenyNS | seccomp.FlagDenyTTY | seccomp.FlagDenyDevel, []byte{
-			0xe8, 0x80, 0x29, 0x8d, 0xf2, 0xbd, 0x67, 0x51,
-			0xd0, 0x04, 0x0f, 0xc2, 0x1b, 0xc0, 0xed, 0x4c,
-			0x00, 0xf9, 0x5d, 0xc0, 0xd7, 0xba, 0x50, 0x6c,
-			0x24, 0x4d, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0xf6, 0x86, 0x6d, 0xba,
-			0x8e, 0xf4, 0xa3, 0x32, 0x96, 0xf2, 0x87, 0xb6,
-			0x6c, 0xcc, 0xc1, 0xd7, 0x8e, 0x97, 0x02, 0x65,
-			0x97, 0xf8, 0x4c, 0xc7, 0xde, 0xc1, 0x57, 0x3e,
-			0x14, 0x89, 0x60, 0xfb, 0xd3, 0x5c, 0xd7, 0x35,
-		}, false},
-		{"strict compat", 0 |
-			seccomp.FlagDenyNS | seccomp.FlagDenyTTY | seccomp.FlagDenyDevel, []byte{
-			0x39, 0x87, 0x1b, 0x93, 0xff, 0xaf, 0xc8, 0xb9,
-			0x79, 0xfc, 0xed, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xc3, 0x7b, 0x9e,
-			0x03, 0x92, 0x2f, 0x5b, 0x02, 0x74, 0x8d, 0xc5,
-			0xc3, 0xc1, 0x7c, 0x92, 0x52, 0x7f, 0x6e, 0x02,
-			0x2e, 0xde, 0x1f, 0x48, 0xbf, 0xf5, 0x92, 0x46,
-			0xea, 0x45, 0x2c, 0x0d, 0x1d, 0xe5, 0x48, 0x27,
-			0x80, 0x8b, 0x1a, 0x6f, 0x84, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0xbd,
-			0xe1, 0xaa, 0x02, 0xae, 0x30, 0xee, 0xdc, 0xfa,
-		}, false},
-	}
-
-	buf := make([]byte, 8)
-	for _, tc := range testCases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			seccomp.CPrintln = log.Println
-			t.Cleanup(func() { seccomp.CPrintln = nil })
-
-			e := seccomp.New(tc.opts)
-			digest := sha512.New()
-
-			if _, err := io.CopyBuffer(digest, e, buf); (err != nil) != tc.wantErr {
-				t.Errorf("Exporter: error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tc.wantErr)
-				return
-			}
-			if err := e.Close(); err != nil {
-				t.Errorf("Close: error = %v", err)
-				return
-			}
-			if got := digest.Sum(nil); slices.Compare(got, tc.want) != 0 {
-				t.Fatalf("Export() hash = %x, want %x",
-					got, tc.want)
-				return
-			}
-		})
-	}
-
-	t.Run("close without use", func(t *testing.T) {
-		e := seccomp.New(0)
-		if err := e.Close(); !errors.Is(err, syscall.EINVAL) {
-			t.Errorf("Close: error = %v", err)
-			return
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("close partial read", func(t *testing.T) {
-		e := seccomp.New(0)
-		if _, err := e.Read(make([]byte, 0)); err != nil {
-			t.Errorf("Read: error = %v", err)
-			return
-		}
-		if err := e.Close(); err == nil || !errors.Is(err, syscall.ECANCELED) || !errors.Is(err, syscall.EBADF) {
-			t.Errorf("Close: error = %v", err)
-			return
-		}
-	})
-}
-
-func BenchmarkExport(b *testing.B) {
-	buf := make([]byte, 8)
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		e := seccomp.New(seccomp.FlagExt |
-			seccomp.FlagDenyNS | seccomp.FlagDenyTTY | seccomp.FlagDenyDevel |
-			seccomp.FlagMultiarch | seccomp.FlagLinux32 | seccomp.FlagCan |
-			seccomp.FlagBluetooth)
-		if _, err := io.CopyBuffer(io.Discard, e, buf); err != nil {
-			b.Fatalf("cannot export: %v", err)
-		}
-		if err := e.Close(); err != nil {
-			b.Fatalf("cannot close exporter: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
-}
diff --git a/helper/seccomp/seccomp-build.c b/helper/seccomp/seccomp-build.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 4b2114f4..00000000
--- a/helper/seccomp/seccomp-build.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,302 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
-#define _GNU_SOURCE // CLONE_NEWUSER
-#endif
-
-#include "seccomp-build.h"
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <sys/syscall.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/personality.h>
-#include <sched.h>
-
-#if (SCMP_VER_MAJOR < 2) || \
-    (SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR < 5) || \
-    (SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR == 5 && SCMP_VER_MICRO < 1)
-#error This package requires libseccomp >= v2.5.1
-#endif
-
-struct f_syscall_act {
-  int                  syscall;
-  int                  m_errno;
-  struct scmp_arg_cmp *arg;
-};
-
-#define LEN(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]))
-
-#define SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(ruleset) do {                                                                         \
-  if (opts & F_VERBOSE) F_println("adding seccomp ruleset \"" #ruleset "\"");                                     \
-  for (int i = 0; i < LEN(ruleset); i++) {                                                                        \
-    assert(ruleset[i].m_errno == EPERM || ruleset[i].m_errno == ENOSYS);                                          \
-                                                                                                                  \
-    if (ruleset[i].arg)                                                                                           \
-      *ret_p = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ruleset[i].m_errno), ruleset[i].syscall, 1, *ruleset[i].arg); \
-    else                                                                                                          \
-      *ret_p = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ruleset[i].m_errno), ruleset[i].syscall, 0);                  \
-                                                                                                                  \
-    if (*ret_p == -EFAULT) {                                                                                      \
-      res = 4;                                                                                                    \
-      goto out;                                                                                                   \
-    } else if (*ret_p < 0) {                                                                                      \
-      res = 5;                                                                                                    \
-      goto out;                                                                                                   \
-    }                                                                                                             \
-  }                                                                                                               \
-} while (0)
-
-int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_syscall_opts opts) {
-  int32_t res = 0; // refer to resErr for meaning
-  int allow_multiarch = opts & F_MULTIARCH;
-  int allowed_personality = PER_LINUX;
-
-  if (opts & F_LINUX32)
-    allowed_personality = PER_LINUX32;
-
-  // flatpak commit 4c3bf179e2e4a2a298cd1db1d045adaf3f564532
-
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_common[] = {
-    // Block dmesg
-    {SCMP_SYS(syslog), EPERM},
-    // Useless old syscall
-    {SCMP_SYS(uselib), EPERM},
-    // Don't allow disabling accounting
-    {SCMP_SYS(acct), EPERM},
-    // Don't allow reading current quota use
-    {SCMP_SYS(quotactl), EPERM},
-
-    // Don't allow access to the kernel keyring
-    {SCMP_SYS(add_key), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(keyctl), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(request_key), EPERM},
-
-    // Scary VM/NUMA ops
-    {SCMP_SYS(move_pages), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(mbind), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(get_mempolicy), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(set_mempolicy), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(migrate_pages), EPERM},
-  };
-
-  // fortify: project-specific extensions
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_common_ext[] = {
-    // system calls for changing the system clock
-    {SCMP_SYS(adjtimex), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(clock_adjtime), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(clock_adjtime64), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(clock_settime), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(clock_settime64), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(settimeofday), EPERM},
-
-    // loading and unloading of kernel modules
-    {SCMP_SYS(delete_module), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(finit_module), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(init_module), EPERM},
-
-    // system calls for rebooting and reboot preparation
-    {SCMP_SYS(kexec_file_load), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(kexec_load), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(reboot), EPERM},
-
-    // system calls for enabling/disabling swap devices
-    {SCMP_SYS(swapoff), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(swapon), EPERM},
-  };
-
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_ns[] = {
-    // Don't allow subnamespace setups:
-    {SCMP_SYS(unshare), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setns), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(mount), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(umount), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(umount2), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(pivot_root), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(chroot), EPERM},
-#if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__CRIS__)
-    // Architectures with CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS2: the child stack
-    // and flags arguments are reversed so the flags come second
-    {SCMP_SYS(clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
-#else
-    // Normally the flags come first
-    {SCMP_SYS(clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
-#endif
-
-    // seccomp can't look into clone3()'s struct clone_args to check whether
-    // the flags are OK, so we have no choice but to block clone3().
-    // Return ENOSYS so user-space will fall back to clone().
-    // (CVE-2021-41133; see also https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/9f6b562d)
-    {SCMP_SYS(clone3), ENOSYS},
-
-    // New mount manipulation APIs can also change our VFS. There's no
-    // legitimate reason to do these in the sandbox, so block all of them
-    // rather than thinking about which ones might be dangerous.
-    // (CVE-2021-41133)
-    {SCMP_SYS(open_tree), ENOSYS},
-    {SCMP_SYS(move_mount), ENOSYS},
-    {SCMP_SYS(fsopen), ENOSYS},
-    {SCMP_SYS(fsconfig), ENOSYS},
-    {SCMP_SYS(fsmount), ENOSYS},
-    {SCMP_SYS(fspick), ENOSYS},
-    {SCMP_SYS(mount_setattr), ENOSYS},
-  };
-
-  // fortify: project-specific extensions
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_ns_ext[] = {
-    // changing file ownership
-    {SCMP_SYS(chown), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(chown32), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(fchown), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(fchown32), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(fchownat), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(lchown), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(lchown32), EPERM},
-
-    // system calls for changing user ID and group ID credentials
-    {SCMP_SYS(setgid), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setgid32), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setgroups), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setgroups32), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setregid), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setregid32), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setresgid), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setresgid32), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setresuid), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setresuid32), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setreuid), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setreuid32), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setuid), EPERM},
-    {SCMP_SYS(setuid32), EPERM},
-  };
-
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_tty[] = {
-    // Don't allow faking input to the controlling tty (CVE-2017-5226)
-    {SCMP_SYS(ioctl), EPERM, &SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int)TIOCSTI)},
-    // In the unlikely event that the controlling tty is a Linux virtual
-    // console (/dev/tty2 or similar), copy/paste operations have an effect
-    // similar to TIOCSTI (CVE-2023-28100)
-    {SCMP_SYS(ioctl), EPERM, &SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int)TIOCLINUX)},
-  };
-
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_devel[] = {
-    // Profiling operations; we expect these to be done by tools from outside
-    // the sandbox.  In particular perf has been the source of many CVEs.
-    {SCMP_SYS(perf_event_open), EPERM},
-    // Don't allow you to switch to bsd emulation or whatnot
-    {SCMP_SYS(personality), EPERM, &SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_NE, allowed_personality)},
-
-    {SCMP_SYS(ptrace), EPERM}
-  };
-
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_emu[] = {
-    // modify_ldt is a historic source of interesting information leaks,
-    // so it's disabled as a hardening measure.
-    // However, it is required to run old 16-bit applications
-    // as well as some Wine patches, so it's allowed in multiarch.
-    {SCMP_SYS(modify_ldt), EPERM},
-  };
-
-  // fortify: project-specific extensions
-  struct f_syscall_act deny_emu_ext[] = {
-    {SCMP_SYS(subpage_prot), ENOSYS},
-    {SCMP_SYS(switch_endian), ENOSYS},
-    {SCMP_SYS(vm86), ENOSYS},
-    {SCMP_SYS(vm86old), ENOSYS},
-  };
-
-  // Blocklist all but unix, inet, inet6 and netlink
-  struct
-  {
-    int            family;
-    f_syscall_opts flags_mask;
-  } socket_family_allowlist[] = {
-    // NOTE: Keep in numerical order
-    { AF_UNSPEC, 0 },
-    { AF_LOCAL, 0 },
-    { AF_INET, 0 },
-    { AF_INET6, 0 },
-    { AF_NETLINK, 0 },
-    { AF_CAN, F_CAN },
-    { AF_BLUETOOTH, F_BLUETOOTH },
-  };
-
-  scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    res = 1;
-    goto out;
-  } else
-    errno = 0;
-
-  // We only really need to handle arches on multiarch systems.
-  // If only one arch is supported the default is fine
-  if (arch != 0) {
-    // This *adds* the target arch, instead of replacing the
-    // native one. This is not ideal, because we'd like to only
-    // allow the target arch, but we can't really disallow the
-    // native arch at this point, because then bubblewrap
-    // couldn't continue running.
-    *ret_p = seccomp_arch_add(ctx, arch);
-    if (*ret_p < 0 && *ret_p != -EEXIST) {
-      res = 2;
-      goto out;
-    }
-
-    if (allow_multiarch && multiarch != 0) {
-      *ret_p = seccomp_arch_add(ctx, multiarch);
-      if (*ret_p < 0 && *ret_p != -EEXIST) {
-        res = 3;
-        goto out;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_common);
-  if (opts & F_DENY_NS) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_ns);
-  if (opts & F_DENY_TTY) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_tty);
-  if (opts & F_DENY_DEVEL) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_devel);
-  if (!allow_multiarch) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_emu);
-  if (opts & F_EXT) {
-    SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_common_ext);
-    if (opts & F_DENY_NS) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_ns_ext);
-    if (!allow_multiarch) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_emu_ext);
-  }
-
-  // Socket filtering doesn't work on e.g. i386, so ignore failures here
-  // However, we need to user seccomp_rule_add_exact to avoid libseccomp doing
-  // something else: https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/8
-  int last_allowed_family = -1;
-  for (int i = 0; i < LEN(socket_family_allowlist); i++) {
-    if (socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask != 0 &&
-        (socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask & opts) != socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask)
-      continue;
-
-    for (int disallowed = last_allowed_family + 1; disallowed < socket_family_allowlist[i].family; disallowed++) {
-      // Blocklist the in-between valid families
-      seccomp_rule_add_exact(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS(socket), 1, SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, disallowed));
-    }
-    last_allowed_family = socket_family_allowlist[i].family;
-  }
-  // Blocklist the rest
-  seccomp_rule_add_exact(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS(socket), 1, SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GE, last_allowed_family + 1));
-
-  if (fd < 0) {
-    *ret_p = seccomp_load(ctx);
-    if (*ret_p != 0) {
-      res = 7;
-      goto out;
-    }
-  } else {
-    *ret_p = seccomp_export_bpf(ctx, fd);
-    if (*ret_p != 0) {
-      res = 6;
-      goto out;
-    }
-  }
-
-out:
-  if (ctx)
-    seccomp_release(ctx);
-
-  return res;
-}
diff --git a/helper/seccomp/seccomp-build.h b/helper/seccomp/seccomp-build.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 7f1be761..00000000
--- a/helper/seccomp/seccomp-build.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <seccomp.h>
-
-#if (SCMP_VER_MAJOR < 2) || \
-    (SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR < 5) || \
-    (SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR == 5 && SCMP_VER_MICRO < 1)
-#error This package requires libseccomp >= v2.5.1
-#endif
-
-typedef enum {
-  F_VERBOSE    = 1 << 0,
-  F_EXT        = 1 << 1,
-  F_DENY_NS    = 1 << 2,
-  F_DENY_TTY   = 1 << 3,
-  F_DENY_DEVEL = 1 << 4,
-  F_MULTIARCH  = 1 << 5,
-  F_LINUX32    = 1 << 6,
-  F_CAN        = 1 << 7,
-  F_BLUETOOTH  = 1 << 8,
-} f_syscall_opts;
-
-extern void F_println(char *v);
-int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_syscall_opts opts);
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/helper/seccomp/seccomp.go b/helper/seccomp/seccomp.go
deleted file mode 100644
index 05c314c9..00000000
--- a/helper/seccomp/seccomp.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
-package seccomp
-
-/*
-#cgo linux pkg-config: --static libseccomp
-
-#include "seccomp-build.h"
-*/
-import "C"
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"runtime"
-	"syscall"
-)
-
-var CPrintln func(v ...any)
-
-// LibraryError represents a libseccomp error.
-type LibraryError struct {
-	Prefix  string
-	Seccomp syscall.Errno
-	Errno   error
-}
-
-func (e *LibraryError) Error() string {
-	if e.Seccomp == 0 {
-		if e.Errno == nil {
-			panic("invalid libseccomp error")
-		}
-		return fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", e.Prefix, e.Errno)
-	}
-	if e.Errno == nil {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", e.Prefix, e.Seccomp)
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s (%s)", e.Prefix, e.Seccomp, e.Errno)
-}
-
-func (e *LibraryError) Is(err error) bool {
-	if e == nil {
-		return err == nil
-	}
-	if ef, ok := err.(*LibraryError); ok {
-		return *e == *ef
-	}
-	return (e.Seccomp != 0 && errors.Is(err, e.Seccomp)) ||
-		(e.Errno != nil && errors.Is(err, e.Errno))
-}
-
-var resPrefix = [...]string{
-	0: "",
-	1: "seccomp_init failed",
-	2: "seccomp_arch_add failed",
-	3: "seccomp_arch_add failed (multiarch)",
-	4: "internal libseccomp failure",
-	5: "seccomp_rule_add failed",
-	6: "seccomp_export_bpf failed",
-	7: "seccomp_load failed",
-}
-
-type SyscallOpts = C.f_syscall_opts
-
-const (
-	flagVerbose SyscallOpts = C.F_VERBOSE
-	// FlagExt are project-specific extensions.
-	FlagExt SyscallOpts = C.F_EXT
-	// FlagDenyNS denies namespace setup syscalls.
-	FlagDenyNS SyscallOpts = C.F_DENY_NS
-	// FlagDenyTTY denies faking input.
-	FlagDenyTTY SyscallOpts = C.F_DENY_TTY
-	// FlagDenyDevel denies development-related syscalls.
-	FlagDenyDevel SyscallOpts = C.F_DENY_DEVEL
-	// FlagMultiarch allows multiarch/emulation.
-	FlagMultiarch SyscallOpts = C.F_MULTIARCH
-	// FlagLinux32 sets PER_LINUX32.
-	FlagLinux32 SyscallOpts = C.F_LINUX32
-	// FlagCan allows AF_CAN.
-	FlagCan SyscallOpts = C.F_CAN
-	// FlagBluetooth allows AF_BLUETOOTH.
-	FlagBluetooth SyscallOpts = C.F_BLUETOOTH
-)
-
-func buildFilter(fd int, opts SyscallOpts) error {
-	var (
-		arch      C.uint32_t = 0
-		multiarch C.uint32_t = 0
-	)
-	switch runtime.GOARCH {
-	case "386":
-		arch = C.SCMP_ARCH_X86
-	case "amd64":
-		arch = C.SCMP_ARCH_X86_64
-		multiarch = C.SCMP_ARCH_X86
-	case "arm":
-		arch = C.SCMP_ARCH_ARM
-	case "arm64":
-		arch = C.SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64
-		multiarch = C.SCMP_ARCH_ARM
-	}
-
-	// this removes repeated transitions between C and Go execution
-	// when producing log output via F_println and CPrintln is nil
-	if CPrintln != nil {
-		opts |= flagVerbose
-	}
-
-	var ret C.int
-	res, err := C.f_build_filter(&ret, C.int(fd), arch, multiarch, opts)
-	if prefix := resPrefix[res]; prefix != "" {
-		return &LibraryError{
-			prefix,
-			-syscall.Errno(ret),
-			err,
-		}
-	}
-	return err
-}
-
-//export F_println
-func F_println(v *C.char) {
-	if CPrintln != nil {
-		CPrintln(C.GoString(v))
-	}
-}
diff --git a/helper/seccomp/seccomp_test.go b/helper/seccomp/seccomp_test.go
deleted file mode 100644
index c04179c1..00000000
--- a/helper/seccomp/seccomp_test.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-package seccomp_test
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"runtime"
-	"syscall"
-	"testing"
-
-	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/helper/seccomp"
-)
-
-func TestLibraryError(t *testing.T) {
-	testCases := []struct {
-		name    string
-		sample  *seccomp.LibraryError
-		want    string
-		wantIs  bool
-		compare error
-	}{
-		{
-			"full",
-			&seccomp.LibraryError{Prefix: "seccomp_export_bpf failed", Seccomp: syscall.ECANCELED, Errno: syscall.EBADF},
-			"seccomp_export_bpf failed: operation canceled (bad file descriptor)",
-			true,
-			&seccomp.LibraryError{Prefix: "seccomp_export_bpf failed", Seccomp: syscall.ECANCELED, Errno: syscall.EBADF},
-		},
-		{
-			"errno only",
-			&seccomp.LibraryError{Prefix: "seccomp_init failed", Errno: syscall.ENOMEM},
-			"seccomp_init failed: cannot allocate memory",
-			false,
-			nil,
-		},
-		{
-			"seccomp only",
-			&seccomp.LibraryError{Prefix: "internal libseccomp failure", Seccomp: syscall.EFAULT},
-			"internal libseccomp failure: bad address",
-			true,
-			syscall.EFAULT,
-		},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range testCases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			if errors.Is(tc.sample, tc.compare) != tc.wantIs {
-				t.Errorf("errors.Is(%#v, %#v) did not return %v",
-					tc.sample, tc.compare, tc.wantIs)
-			}
-
-			if got := tc.sample.Error(); got != tc.want {
-				t.Errorf("Error: %q, want %q",
-					got, tc.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-
-	t.Run("invalid", func(t *testing.T) {
-		wantPanic := "invalid libseccomp error"
-		defer func() {
-			if r := recover(); r != wantPanic {
-				t.Errorf("panic: %q, want %q", r, wantPanic)
-			}
-		}()
-		runtime.KeepAlive(new(seccomp.LibraryError).Error())
-	})
-}