app: run in native sandbox

Signed-off-by: Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk>

3 files changed, 175 insertions, 142 deletions

diff --git a/fst/app.go b/fst/app.go
index 87a836ca..3e026391 100644
--- a/fst/app.go
+++ b/fst/app.go
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 package fst
 
 import (
-	"context"
 	"time"
 )
 
@@ -19,7 +18,7 @@ type App interface {
 
 type SealedApp interface {
 	// Run commits sealed system setup and starts the app process.
-	Run(ctx context.Context, rs *RunState) error
+	Run(rs *RunState) error
 }
 
 // RunState stores the outcome of a call to [SealedApp.Run].
diff --git a/fst/config.go b/fst/config.go
index d96934d4..7fc3af6c 100644
--- a/fst/config.go
+++ b/fst/config.go
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ package fst
 
 import (
 	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/dbus"
-	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/helper/bwrap"
+	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/sandbox/seccomp"
 	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/system"
 )
 
@@ -14,8 +14,11 @@ type Config struct {
 	// passed to wayland security-context-v1 as application ID
 	// and used as part of defaults in dbus session proxy
 	ID string `json:"id"`
-	// final argv, passed to init
-	Command []string `json:"command"`
+
+	// absolute path to executable file
+	Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
+	// final args passed to container init
+	Args []string `json:"args"`
 
 	Confinement ConfinementConfig `json:"confinement"`
 }
@@ -26,13 +29,13 @@ type ConfinementConfig struct {
 	AppID int `json:"app_id"`
 	// list of supplementary groups to inherit
 	Groups []string `json:"groups"`
-	// passwd username in the sandbox, defaults to passwd name of target uid or chronos
+	// passwd username in container, defaults to passwd name of target uid or chronos
 	Username string `json:"username,omitempty"`
-	// home directory in sandbox, empty for outer
+	// home directory in container, empty for outer
 	Inner string `json:"home_inner"`
 	// home directory in init namespace
 	Outer string `json:"home"`
-	// bwrap sandbox confinement configuration
+	// abstract sandbox configuration
 	Sandbox *SandboxConfig `json:"sandbox"`
 	// extra acl ops, runs after everything else
 	ExtraPerms []*ExtraPermConfig `json:"extra_perms,omitempty"`
@@ -44,7 +47,7 @@ type ConfinementConfig struct {
 	// nil value makes session bus proxy assume built-in defaults
 	SessionBus *dbus.Config `json:"session_bus,omitempty"`
 
-	// system resources to expose to the sandbox
+	// system resources to expose to the container
 	Enablements system.Enablements `json:"enablements"`
 }
 
@@ -76,24 +79,12 @@ func (e *ExtraPermConfig) String() string {
 	return string(buf)
 }
 
-type FilesystemConfig struct {
-	// mount point in sandbox, same as src if empty
-	Dst string `json:"dst,omitempty"`
-	// host filesystem path to make available to sandbox
-	Src string `json:"src"`
-	// write access
-	Write bool `json:"write,omitempty"`
-	// device access
-	Device bool `json:"dev,omitempty"`
-	// fail if mount fails
-	Must bool `json:"require,omitempty"`
-}
-
 // Template returns a fully populated instance of Config.
 func Template() *Config {
 	return &Config{
-		ID: "org.chromium.Chromium",
-		Command: []string{
+		ID:   "org.chromium.Chromium",
+		Path: "/run/current-system/sw/bin/chromium",
+		Args: []string{
 			"chromium",
 			"--ignore-gpu-blocklist",
 			"--disable-smooth-scrolling",
@@ -108,11 +99,13 @@ func Template() *Config {
 			Inner:    "/var/lib/fortify",
 			Sandbox: &SandboxConfig{
 				Hostname:      "localhost",
-				UserNS:        true,
+				Devel:         true,
+				Userns:        true,
 				Net:           true,
 				Dev:           true,
-				Syscall:       &bwrap.SyscallPolicy{DenyDevel: true, Multiarch: true},
-				NoNewSession:  true,
+				Seccomp:       seccomp.FlagMultiarch,
+				Tty:           true,
+				Multiarch:     true,
 				MapRealUID:    true,
 				DirectWayland: false,
 				// example API credentials pulled from Google Chrome
@@ -131,10 +124,10 @@ func Template() *Config {
 						Dst: "/data/data/org.chromium.Chromium", Write: true, Must: true},
 					{Src: "/dev/dri", Device: true},
 				},
-				Link:     [][2]string{{"/run/user/65534", "/run/user/150"}},
-				Etc:      "/etc",
-				AutoEtc:  true,
-				Override: []string{"/var/run/nscd"},
+				Link:    [][2]string{{"/run/user/65534", "/run/user/150"}},
+				Etc:     "/etc",
+				AutoEtc: true,
+				Cover:   []string{"/var/run/nscd"},
 			},
 			ExtraPerms: []*ExtraPermConfig{
 				{Path: "/var/lib/fortify/u0", Ensure: true, Execute: true},
diff --git a/fst/sandbox.go b/fst/sandbox.go
index fc12da43..b1240eca 100644
--- a/fst/sandbox.go
+++ b/fst/sandbox.go
@@ -4,125 +4,149 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io/fs"
+	"maps"
 	"path"
+	"slices"
+	"syscall"
 
 	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/dbus"
-	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/helper/bwrap"
+	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/sandbox"
+	"git.gensokyo.uk/security/fortify/sandbox/seccomp"
 )
 
 // SandboxConfig describes resources made available to the sandbox.
-type SandboxConfig struct {
-	// unix hostname within sandbox
-	Hostname string `json:"hostname,omitempty"`
-	// allow userns within sandbox
-	UserNS bool `json:"userns,omitempty"`
-	// share net namespace
-	Net bool `json:"net,omitempty"`
-	// share all devices
-	Dev bool `json:"dev,omitempty"`
-	// seccomp syscall filter policy
-	Syscall *bwrap.SyscallPolicy `json:"syscall"`
-	// do not run in new session
-	NoNewSession bool `json:"no_new_session,omitempty"`
-	// map target user uid to privileged user uid in the user namespace
-	MapRealUID bool `json:"map_real_uid"`
-	// direct access to wayland socket; when this gets set no attempt is made to attach security-context-v1
-	// and the bare socket is mounted to the sandbox
-	DirectWayland bool `json:"direct_wayland,omitempty"`
+type (
+	SandboxConfig struct {
+		// container hostname
+		Hostname string `json:"hostname,omitempty"`
 
-	// final environment variables
-	Env map[string]string `json:"env"`
-	// sandbox host filesystem access
-	Filesystem []*FilesystemConfig `json:"filesystem"`
-	// symlinks created inside the sandbox
-	Link [][2]string `json:"symlink"`
-	// read-only /etc directory
-	Etc string `json:"etc,omitempty"`
-	// automatically set up /etc symlinks
-	AutoEtc bool `json:"auto_etc"`
-	// mount tmpfs over these paths,
-	// runs right before [ConfinementConfig.ExtraPerms]
-	Override []string `json:"override"`
-}
+		// extra seccomp flags
+		Seccomp seccomp.SyscallOpts `json:"seccomp"`
+		// allow ptrace and friends
+		Devel bool `json:"devel,omitempty"`
+		// allow userns creation in container
+		Userns bool `json:"userns,omitempty"`
+		// share host net namespace
+		Net bool `json:"net,omitempty"`
+		// expose main process tty
+		Tty bool `json:"tty,omitempty"`
+		// allow multiarch
+		Multiarch bool `json:"multiarch,omitempty"`
 
-// SandboxSys encapsulates system functions used during the creation of [bwrap.Config].
-type SandboxSys interface {
-	Getuid() int
-	Paths() Paths
-	ReadDir(name string) ([]fs.DirEntry, error)
-	EvalSymlinks(path string) (string, error)
+		// initial process environment variables
+		Env map[string]string `json:"env"`
+		// map target user uid to privileged user uid in the user namespace
+		MapRealUID bool `json:"map_real_uid"`
 
-	Println(v ...any)
-	Printf(format string, v ...any)
-}
+		// expose all devices
+		Dev bool `json:"dev,omitempty"`
+		// container host filesystem bind mounts
+		Filesystem []*FilesystemConfig `json:"filesystem"`
+		// create symlinks inside container filesystem
+		Link [][2]string `json:"symlink"`
 
-// Bwrap returns the address of the corresponding bwrap.Config to s.
-// Note that remaining tmpfs entries must be queued by the caller prior to launch.
-func (s *SandboxConfig) Bwrap(sys SandboxSys, uid *int) (*bwrap.Config, error) {
-	if s == nil {
-		return nil, errors.New("nil sandbox config")
+		// direct access to wayland socket; when this gets set no attempt is made to attach security-context-v1
+		// and the bare socket is mounted to the sandbox
+		DirectWayland bool `json:"direct_wayland,omitempty"`
+
+		// read-only /etc directory
+		Etc string `json:"etc,omitempty"`
+		// automatically set up /etc symlinks
+		AutoEtc bool `json:"auto_etc"`
+		// cover these paths or create them if they do not already exist
+		Cover []string `json:"cover"`
 	}
 
-	if s.Syscall == nil {
-		sys.Println("syscall filter not configured, PROCEED WITH CAUTION")
+	// SandboxSys encapsulates system functions used during [sandbox.Container] initialisation.
+	SandboxSys interface {
+		Getuid() int
+		Getgid() int
+		Paths() Paths
+		ReadDir(name string) ([]fs.DirEntry, error)
+		EvalSymlinks(path string) (string, error)
+
+		Println(v ...any)
+		Printf(format string, v ...any)
 	}
 
-	if !s.MapRealUID {
-		// mapped uid defaults to 65534 to work around file ownership checks due to a bwrap limitation
-		*uid = 65534
-	} else {
-		// some programs fail to connect to dbus session running as a different uid, so a separate workaround
-		// is introduced to map priv-side caller uid in namespace
-		*uid = sys.Getuid()
+	// FilesystemConfig is a representation of [sandbox.BindMount].
+	FilesystemConfig struct {
+		// mount point in container, same as src if empty
+		Dst string `json:"dst,omitempty"`
+		// host filesystem path to make available to the container
+		Src string `json:"src"`
+		// do not mount filesystem read-only
+		Write bool `json:"write,omitempty"`
+		// do not disable device files
+		Device bool `json:"dev,omitempty"`
+		// fail if the bind mount cannot be established for any reason
+		Must bool `json:"require,omitempty"`
 	}
+)
 
-	conf := (&bwrap.Config{
-		Net:      s.Net,
-		UserNS:   s.UserNS,
-		UID:      uid,
-		GID:      uid,
-		Hostname: s.Hostname,
-		Clearenv: true,
-		SetEnv:   s.Env,
+// ToContainer initialises [sandbox.Params] via [SandboxConfig].
+// Note that remaining container setup must be queued by the [App] implementation.
+func (s *SandboxConfig) ToContainer(sys SandboxSys, uid, gid *int) (*sandbox.Params, map[string]string, error) {
+	if s == nil {
+		return nil, nil, syscall.EBADE
+	}
 
-		/* this is only 4 KiB of memory on a 64-bit system,
-		permissive defaults on NixOS results in around 100 entries
-		so this capacity should eliminate copies for most setups */
-		Filesystem: make([]bwrap.FSBuilder, 0, 256),
+	container := &sandbox.Params{
+		Hostname: s.Hostname,
+		Ops:      new(sandbox.Ops),
+		Seccomp:  s.Seccomp,
+	}
 
-		Syscall:       s.Syscall,
-		NewSession:    !s.NoNewSession,
-		DieWithParent: true,
-		AsInit:        true,
+	/* this is only 4 KiB of memory on a 64-bit system,
+	permissive defaults on NixOS results in around 100 entries
+	so this capacity should eliminate copies for most setups */
+	*container.Ops = slices.Grow(*container.Ops, 1<<8)
 
-		// initialise unconditionally as Once cannot be justified
-		// for saving such a miniscule amount of memory
-		Chmod: make(bwrap.ChmodConfig),
-	}).
-		Procfs("/proc").
-		Tmpfs(Tmp, 4*1024)
+	if s.Devel {
+		container.Flags |= sandbox.FAllowDevel
+	}
+	if s.Userns {
+		container.Flags |= sandbox.FAllowUserns
+	}
+	if s.Net {
+		container.Flags |= sandbox.FAllowNet
+	}
+	if s.Tty {
+		container.Flags |= sandbox.FAllowTTY
+	}
 
-	if !s.Dev {
-		conf.DevTmpfs("/dev").Mqueue("/dev/mqueue")
+	if s.MapRealUID {
+		/* some programs fail to connect to dbus session running as a different uid
+		so this workaround is introduced to map priv-side caller uid in container */
+		container.Uid = sys.Getuid()
+		*uid = container.Uid
+		container.Gid = sys.Getgid()
+		*gid = container.Gid
 	} else {
-		conf.Bind("/dev", "/dev", false, true, true)
+		*uid = sandbox.OverflowUid()
+		*gid = sandbox.OverflowGid()
 	}
 
-	if !s.AutoEtc {
-		if s.Etc == "" {
-			conf.Dir("/etc")
-		} else {
-			conf.Bind(s.Etc, "/etc")
-		}
+	container.
+		Proc("/proc").
+		Tmpfs(Tmp, 1<<12, 0755)
+
+	if !s.Dev {
+		container.Dev("/dev").Mqueue("/dev/mqueue")
+	} else {
+		container.Bind("/dev", "/dev", sandbox.BindDevice)
 	}
 
-	// retrieve paths and hide them if they're made available in the sandbox
+	/* retrieve paths and hide them if they're made available in the sandbox;
+	this feature tries to improve user experience of permissive defaults, and
+	to warn about issues in custom configuration; it is NOT a security feature
+	and should not be treated as such, ALWAYS be careful with what you bind */
 	var hidePaths []string
 	sc := sys.Paths()
 	hidePaths = append(hidePaths, sc.RuntimePath, sc.SharePath)
 	_, systemBusAddr := dbus.Address()
 	if entries, err := dbus.Parse([]byte(systemBusAddr)); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
+		return nil, nil, err
 	} else {
 		// there is usually only one, do not preallocate
 		for _, entry := range entries {
@@ -148,7 +172,7 @@ func (s *SandboxConfig) Bwrap(sys SandboxSys, uid *int) (*bwrap.Config, error) {
 	hidePathMatch := make([]bool, len(hidePaths))
 	for i := range hidePaths {
 		if err := evalSymlinks(sys, &hidePaths[i]); err != nil {
-			return nil, err
+			return nil, nil, err
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -158,19 +182,19 @@ func (s *SandboxConfig) Bwrap(sys SandboxSys, uid *int) (*bwrap.Config, error) {
 		}
 
 		if !path.IsAbs(c.Src) {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("src path %q is not absolute", c.Src)
+			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("src path %q is not absolute", c.Src)
 		}
 
 		dest := c.Dst
 		if c.Dst == "" {
 			dest = c.Src
 		} else if !path.IsAbs(dest) {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("dst path %q is not absolute", dest)
+			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("dst path %q is not absolute", dest)
 		}
 
 		srcH := c.Src
 		if err := evalSymlinks(sys, &srcH); err != nil {
-			return nil, err
+			return nil, nil, err
 		}
 
 		for i := range hidePaths {
@@ -180,54 +204,71 @@ func (s *SandboxConfig) Bwrap(sys SandboxSys, uid *int) (*bwrap.Config, error) {
 			}
 
 			if ok, err := deepContainsH(srcH, hidePaths[i]); err != nil {
-				return nil, err
+				return nil, nil, err
 			} else if ok {
 				hidePathMatch[i] = true
 				sys.Printf("hiding paths from %q", c.Src)
 			}
 		}
 
-		conf.Bind(c.Src, dest, !c.Must, c.Write, c.Device)
+		var flags int
+		if c.Write {
+			flags |= sandbox.BindWritable
+		}
+		if c.Device {
+			flags |= sandbox.BindDevice | sandbox.BindWritable
+		}
+		if !c.Must {
+			flags |= sandbox.BindOptional
+		}
+		container.Bind(c.Src, dest, flags)
 	}
 
-	// hide marked paths before setting up shares
+	// cover matched paths
 	for i, ok := range hidePathMatch {
 		if ok {
-			conf.Tmpfs(hidePaths[i], 8192)
+			container.Tmpfs(hidePaths[i], 1<<13, 0755)
 		}
 	}
 
 	for _, l := range s.Link {
-		conf.Symlink(l[0], l[1])
+		container.Link(l[0], l[1])
 	}
 
-	if s.AutoEtc {
-		etc := s.Etc
-		if etc == "" {
-			etc = "/etc"
+	// perf: this might work better if implemented as a setup op in container init
+	if !s.AutoEtc {
+		if s.Etc != "" {
+			container.Bind(s.Etc, "/etc", 0)
+		}
+	} else {
+		etcPath := s.Etc
+		if etcPath == "" {
+			etcPath = "/etc"
 		}
-		conf.Bind(etc, Tmp+"/etc")
+		container.
+			Bind(etcPath, Tmp+"/etc", 0).
+			Mkdir("/etc", 0700)
 
-		// link host /etc contents to prevent passwd/group from being overwritten
-		if d, err := sys.ReadDir(etc); err != nil {
-			return nil, err
+		// link host /etc contents to prevent dropping passwd/group bind mounts
+		if d, err := sys.ReadDir(etcPath); err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, err
 		} else {
 			for _, ent := range d {
-				name := ent.Name()
-				switch name {
+				n := ent.Name()
+				switch n {
 				case "passwd":
 				case "group":
 
 				case "mtab":
-					conf.Symlink("/proc/mounts", "/etc/"+name)
+					container.Link("/proc/mounts", "/etc/"+n)
 				default:
-					conf.Symlink(Tmp+"/etc/"+name, "/etc/"+name)
+					container.Link(Tmp+"/etc/"+n, "/etc/"+n)
 				}
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
-	return conf, nil
+	return container, maps.Clone(s.Env), nil
 }
 
 func evalSymlinks(sys SandboxSys, v *string) error {