diff options
| author | Daniel Micay <daniel.micay@grapheneos.org> | 2024-06-20 22:31:32 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Micay <daniel.micay@grapheneos.org> | 2024-06-20 22:33:44 -0400 |
| commit | 7cb01fc3bd97323f6ed77403d9a511a53a24fdc7 (patch) | |
| tree | c8eadf4c7cdb38e2d6aaad37ca92b0fd207dd9bf /static | |
| parent | d92f0e04751252e7fc744ec6a3dc31e5381e6af7 (diff) | |
fix wording for deny_new_usb2 integration
Diffstat (limited to 'static')
| -rw-r--r-- | static/releases.html | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/static/releases.html b/static/releases.html index ff26648f..065aba34 100644 --- a/static/releases.html +++ b/static/releases.html @@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ <li>remove our USB peripheral security setting on devices supporting our much better USB-C port mode (Pixel 6 and later)</li> <li>extend USB-C port setting to also handle pogo pins on the Pixel Tablet</li> <li>kernel (5.10, 5.15, 6.1, 6.6): replace our deny_new_usb feature with a new deny_new_usb2 feature also disabling USB gadgets</li> - <li>extend USB-C port setting to enable deny_new_usb2 as a second layer of defense disabling new USB connections and then USB data at a hardware level, in case the USB controller is compromised or doesn't work correctly</li> + <li>extend USB-C port setting to enable deny_new_usb2 as a second layer of defense disabling new USB connections in the kernel (the existing implementation disables new connections and USB data at a hardware level via the USB controller, which disables more attack surface, but we want to keep around the higher level kernel approach too)</li> <li>Files: fix upstream null pointer exception triggered on resuming activity</li> <li>Settings: require user authentication for changing auto-reboot, USB peripheral and USB-C port security settings</li> <li>Settings: avoid prompting for user authentication when selecting the same value as before for GrapheneOS settings requiring it</li> |