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| author | Daniel Micay <daniel.micay@grapheneos.org> | 2025-02-14 12:30:21 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Micay <daniel.micay@grapheneos.org> | 2025-02-14 12:30:21 -0500 |
| commit | 3bd71421d109995b8b7e4e11c891ec58111f9ff1 (patch) | |
| tree | de85047ddbe83bdf03ab3ba613a96d668ce7688f /static/features.html | |
| parent | d2da1793b5ca7431554f3fc1c15000050055b4a6 (diff) | |
document early boot free memory zeroing
Diffstat (limited to 'static/features.html')
| -rw-r--r-- | static/features.html | 9 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/static/features.html b/static/features.html index 28daaa6b..23bd782a 100644 --- a/static/features.html +++ b/static/features.html @@ -387,6 +387,15 @@ released retains data indefinitely until the memory is handed out for other uses and gets partially or fully overwritten by new data.</li> + <li>In early boot, all the memory not being used by the OS is + zeroed to get rid of any data leftover from a previous boot in + case zero-on-free didn't have the opportunity to clear it as + part of a clean reboot/shutdown. All the devices we support have + a reset attack protection feature we proposed zeroing memory for + firmware-based boot modes, but we need to finish it up by adding + it for the OS boot modes ourselves. Fully encrypted RAM with a + per-boot key cycled on reboots will eventually obsolete these + features for newer devices.</li> <li>Kernel stack allocations are zeroed to make most uninitialized data usage vulnerabilities harmless.</li> <li>Assorted attack surface reduction through disabling |
